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Nathan W. Hill and Lauren Gawne
1  The contribution of Tibetan languages  
to the study of evidentiality
In his Aṣṭādhyāyī the great Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini cryptically notes the 
grammatical encoding of information source with the words parokṣe liṭ ‘one uses 
the perfect tense in reference to past action not linked to the present day and not 
witnessed’ (Hock 2012: 93–101); so began the study of evidentiality.1 Although 
Tibetan grammatical studies, like all domains of traditional Tibetan high culture, 
build upon Indian models, the Tibetan grammarians did not inherit an explicit 
awareness of evidentiality.
Alexandra Aikhenvald’s 2004 monograph Evidentiality is the most thorough 
typological treatment of evidentiality to date, drawing on grammatical descriptions 
of over 500 languages (Aikhenvald 2004: xii). While Aikhenvald concedes that “evi-
dentiality in Tibetan varieties was hardly mentioned” (Aikhenvald 2012: 467, Note 
20) in her study, she does make reference to four Tibetan varieties, viz. Ladhaki, 
Amdo, Sherpa, and Lhasa. The World Atlas of Language Structures’ (WALS) survey 
of evidentiality2 draws on three of the same four Tibetan languages, omitting Lhasa, 
on the basis of the same secondary literature as Aikhenvald. There is scope both for 
increased documentation of Tibetan evidential systems and for typological work on 
evidentiality to make more ample use of the Tibetan data already available. Such 
work will deepen the understanding of specific Tibetan varieties and improve typo-
logical theorizing on evidentiality (cf. Hill 2013a: 51–52; Tournadre, this volume). 
By making the results of research on Tibetan evidential systems more conveniently 
accessible, the work in the reader’s hands aids in filling these lacunae. 
The title of this work and this introduction refer to the varieties of Tibetan 
spoken today as Tibetan languages (we discuss this terminology in §5 below). 
We follow Tournadre in drawing together this “well-defined family of languages 
derived from Old Tibetan” (Tournadre 2014: 107). As all families do, these lan-
guages demonstrate phonetically regular reflexes of historic forms, share a core 
vocabulary, and retain many elements of inherited grammar. As this volume 
1 Boas (1911: 43) often mistakenly receives credit for the earliest discussion of grammatical mar-
king of information souce (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004: 12–13, 2014: 4). 
2 http://wals.info/feature/77A#2/16.6/148.7
Note: A list of abbreviations appears at the end of this chapter. Where possible, glosses in citations 
from other authors have been regularized to the Leipzig Glossing Rules.
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demonstrates, despite their common features, these languages encode evidentia-
lity in different ways, demonstrating the outcome of historical developments (see 
§4). Just as there is variation in how Tibetan languages have grammaticalised evi-
dentiality, the speakers of these languages do not necessarily consider themselves 
as belonging to a single unified group. Tibetan language speakers reside in Tibet, 
other parts of China, India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Pakistan. Many Tibetan language 
speakers will not refer to themselves as Tibetan, but consider themselves to be a 
member of a specific cultural group, such as Sherpa, or Bhutia. In addition, not all 
Tibetan language speakers share the same Buddhist culture, e.g. the Purik and the 
Balti are predominantly Muslim (Zemp, this volume), and many Buddhist groups 
like the Yolmo have a synchronous indigenous tradition (Desjarlais 1992). This 
volume attempts to give some illustration of the diversity of Tibetan languages, 
with contributions on varieties from China, Nepal, India and Bhutan.
Lhasa Tibetan is far and away the best described Tibetan variety. Con-
sequently, to the extent typologists make reference to Tibetan at all, they 
rely primarily on Lhasa Tibetan and traditions of its analysis, in particular 
‘conjunct-disjunct’ and ‘egophoric’. The three evidential categories of Lhasa 
Tibetan (called ‘personal’, ‘experiential’, and ‘factual’ in this introduction) serve 
as the point of departure in the exploration of other Tibetan varieties and in the 
study of the development of evidentials throughout Tibet’s long literary history. 
This introduction describes in turn, the history of the study of Lhasa Tibetan evi-
dentiality (§1), the use of Lhasa Tibetan in typological discussions (§2), the study 
of other Tibetan varieties (§3), and research on the historical development of 
Tibetan evidentials (§4). The contributions to this volume correspondingly present 
research on Lhasa Tibetan, typology, other Tibetan varieties, and the historical 
emergence of Tibetan evidentiality and we refer to these contributions throug-
hout this introduction. In §5 we discuss the conventions and nomenclature of the 
volume overall. Throughout this introduction we offer a standardized terminology 
(personal, factual, and experiential) as equivalences to the terminology of specific 
authors, in order to facilitate comparison among authors and Tibetan varieties.
While we have given a definition of Tibetan, we have not given a defini-
tion of evidentiality. Aikhenvald’s definition of evidentiality as “a grammatical 
expression of information source” (2015: 239) has a simplicity, and certainly has 
popularity. This rather narrow definition has perhaps led her to miss the nature 
of evidentiality in languages like Tibetan, which we discuss below. Tournadre 
and LaPolla (2014) also believe that Aikhenvald’s definition is too narrow. After a 
survey of some Tibetan varieties, and beyond, they give a definition of “the repre-
sentation of source and access to information according to the speaker’s perspec-
tive and strategy” (Tournadre and LaPolla 2014: 240). The inclusion of ‘access 
to information’ and ‘speaker’s perspective’ is intended to tease out some of the 
subtleties of personal evidentiality, which we discuss below. Attempting to find 
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one definition of evidentiality that applies to all languages may prove elusive. 
As can be seen in this volume, even closely related languages may use cognate 
forms in very different ways. Similarly, linguists from different theoretical back-
grounds may approach the question of evidentiality in different ways. We have 
not constrained our authors by asking them to employ a particular definition of 
evidentiality in their analyses.
As a related issue, attempting to articulate the relationship between evidenti-
ality and other grammatical features, particularly those contextually-dependent 
features related to speaker stance, is unlikely to be a successful endeavor at the 
cross-linguistic level. Our authors expand on the interaction of evidentiality with 
other grammatical features as they see fit for a particular language. For many 
of our authors an understanding of modality, speaker perspective, and interro-
gativity within a particular language are vital to an understanding of evidentia-
lity. For example, for Hyslop and Tshering (this volume) evidentiality is entirely 
subsumed within the epistemic system. In order to keep this introduction to a 
containable size, we focus on the grammatical categories of evidentiality speci-
fically, but we also acknowledge that within a single language these cannot be 
understood in isolation from other features of the language.
1.1 The study of Lhasa Tibetan evidentiality
Research on Lhasa Tibetan evidentiality divides into three groups: 1. early peda-
gogical grammars, where evidentiality is treated more or less as a form of person 
agreement, 2. linguistic research where the three-term Lhasa system is analysed 
as reflecting binary settings of interacting features, 3. linguistic research where 
the three semantic categories encoded by the evidential system are described 
as isomorphic with the three morphosyntactic categories used to encode them. 
These three approaches broadly correspond with chronologically distinct stages 
in research on Tibetan evidentiality, and reflect an overarching movement away 
from a priori commitments to person and toward characterizations that are both 
structurally verifiable and motivated by usage in discourse. However, there are 
striking exceptions to the chronological pattern. While Yukawa Yasutoshi already 
championed the third approach in 1966, some typologists continue today to rely 
on outdated treatments of Tibetan evidential systems in discussions of person 
agreement (see Bickel and Nichols 2007: 223–224; Aikhenvald 2015: 257). Alt-
hough a useful heuristic, the division of researchers among these three groups 
is somewhat arbitrary. No researcher unambiguously equates the Lhasa system 
with person agreement of the Indo-European type, to do so would be foolish. 
Concomitantly, until recently few researchers vehemently disavowed grammati-
cal person.
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As terms for the basic meanings that the Lhasa categories express, ‘mood’ or 
‘modality’ (Takeuchi 1978; Tournadre 1996: 217; Denwood 1999: 119), ‘evidentia-
lity’ (DeLancey 1992: 45; Tournadre 1996: 217; Denwood 1999: 119), and ‘deixis’ 
(Tournadre 1992; Beckwith 1992; Bartee 1996) have all enjoyed popularity. It 
would be meaningless to attempt to adjudicate among these terms, as no single 
rubric will ever capture the subtleties of the Lhasa Tibetan evidential system. In 
the current volume, most authors prefer the terminology of ‘evidentiality’, but as 
the reader will see, Tibetan varieties fail to support the claim that evidentiality 
“does not bear any straightforward relationship to truth, the validity of a state-
ment or the speaker’s responsibility” (Aikhenvald 2014: 44). 
1.1.1 Early pedagogical grammarians
Early pedagogical grammars of spoken Lhasa or Central Tibetan attempt to 
describe the language’s three evidential categories as person agreement. Authors 
themselves acknowledge the imperfect fit. Writing that personal yod “is more com-
monly used with the 1st person” (1894: 46), Graham Sandberg pointedly avoids the 
direct identification of this category with first person agreement. Vincent Hender-
son habitually translates the personal verb suffixes -yin and -yod as first person 
and the suffixes -red and -ḥdug as both second and third person, but he inclu-
des caveats along the lines that sometimes “yin is also heard with 2nd and 3rd 
persons” (1903: 33). Charles Bell continues to suggest that these suffixes indicate 
person agreement by offering paradigms such as ṅas blug-gi-yod ‘I pour’ (perso-
nal) and khos blug-gi-ḥdug ‘He pours’ (experiential) (1905: 37). Nonetheless, when 
writing about the use of the relevant forms as existential verbs rather than as tense 
suffixes, he also draws attention to the importance of evidence. He writes that as 
a general rule it may be said that yod [personal] means ‘it is there, I saw it there and know that 
it is still there’; ḥdug [experiential] means ‘I saw it there but I am not sure whether it is still there 
or not’; yod-pa-red [factual] means, ‘I did not see it, but have heard that it is there’. (1905: 40)
Unfortunately, Bell’s observations on the evidential meanings of the existential 
verbs languished for some time.3 
3 Writing more than 50 years after Bell, Roerich and Phuntshok remain exactly where 
Sandberg and Henderson left matters. They caution that the apparent association of certain suf-
fixes with grammatical person is “rather irregular” (1957: 48) and underline that in the Tibetan 
verbal system “the persons are not distinguished” (1957: 48). Nonetheless, they identify the choice 
of evidential category with person agreement, noting that personal yod is used “for the first per-
son singular and plural, and [experiential] ḥdug in the second and third persons” (1957: 49–50).
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Like Bell, Chang and Shefts continue to treat the tense suffixes as marking 
person (1964: 25), while singling out the existential verbs for alternative treatment. 
Unlike Bell, they distinguish the latter in terms of certainty (1964: 18) rather than evi-
dence. Also in keeping with the precedence of Bell, Goldstein and Nornang speak of 
person when describing the verbal suffixes (1970: 408–409) but in their discussion 
of existential verbs they distinguish experiential ḥdug “actual visual knowledge” 
from factual yod-pa-red “hearsay and knowledge other than visual” (1970: 23). Thus, 
altogether early pedagogical grammars never abandoned the attempt to characte-
rize the Lhasa Tibetan verbal system in terms of person agreement, through time the 
importance of information source gradually emerged. In assessing the accuracy of 
these pedagogical treatments, one must bear in mind the classroom context, where 
a comprehensible oversimplification often commends itself. 
1.1.2 Interacting binary features
A ramification of the early pedagogical treatments’ identification of the Lhasa perso-
nal evidential category with first person agreement is the bifurcation of the three term 
Lhasa system into a two way opposition of personal (associated with first person) 
versus factual and experiential taken together (both associated with both second 
and third person). Such a tack precipitates the need to subsequently bifurcate factual 
and experiential without recourse to person agreement. Thus, it is no coincidence 
that to the limited extent Goldstein and Nornang (1970: 408/409) invoke source of 
knowledge they do so to distinguish between factual and experiential. 
Whether out of deference to this pedagogical heritage or under the influence 
of a Jakobsonian penchant for binary features, many of the linguists who studied 
the Lhasa Tibetan verbal system in the latter part of the 20th century upheld this 
analysis of double bifurcation. Thus, Takeuchi Tsuguhito divides Lhasa Tibetan 
‘modus’ into 内的 ‘inner’ (personal) and 外的 ‘outer’, with the latter subsuming 
直接認識 ‘direct recognition’ and 間接認識 ‘indirect recognition’ (1978). Indepen-
dently of Takeuchi and of each other, in 1992 a further three scholars describe 
the three Lhasa Tibetan evidential categories in terms of two binary contrasts. 
Scott DeLancey distinguishes “conjunct” (personal) and “disjunct”, dividing the 
disjunct into “mirative” (experiential) and “non-mirative” (factual) (1992: 45). 
Nicolas Tournadre distinguishes between “égophoriques” (personal) and “hété-
rophoriques” auxiliaries (1992: 197), dividing the latter between “constatif” 
(experiential) and “assertif” (factual) (1992: 207).4 Less clearly, Christopher 
4 Since they have been influential outside of the study of Tibetan varieties, we return to 
DeLancey’s ‘conjunct-disjunct’ (§2.1) and Tournadre’s ‘egophoric’ (§2.2) in greater detail below.
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Beckwith posits a primary distinction of ‘personal deictic class’ of “first versus 
second and third persons” (1992: 2) but recognizes “evidentials” (1992: 11) within 
the latter class. Ellen Bartee (1996) repeats DeLancey’s account, as does Krisa-
dawan Hongladarom, although she notes that his classification is “not wholly 
adequate” (1992: 1151). Philip Denwood’s description of the Lhasa Tibetan three 
term evidential system as resulting from binary interactions of up to four inde-
pendent factors ‘person’, ‘evidentiality’, ‘viewpoint’, and ‘generality’ (1999: 150) 
represents the apogee of a Jacobsonian binary approach. This machinery allows 
him to explain the use of the relevant morphemes in a wide array of contexts, 
but using a descriptive apparatus of 16 possible settings to account for three 
paradigmatically contrasting categories is excessive. 
1.1.3 Three contrasting forms means three contrasting functions
The earliest published dedicated study of Tibetan evidentiality we are aware of is 
Yukawa Yasutoshi’s 1966 article on ḥdug, a revised version of his 1964 master’s 
thesis. He followed this study with overall treatments of Tibetan predicates in 
1971 and 1975. Yukawa’s approach is to treat each morphological suffix in turn in 
all of the syntactic positions in which it occurs, with a sensitivity to the interactio-
nal context. In the third of these publications he says the personal “話し手〈疑
問文の場合は話し相手〉にとって身近に感じられる状麓をあらわし [denotes a 
state with which the speaker (or the listener in interrogative sentences) feels fami-
liar]” the factual “ある状態であるととを客観的に断定する objectively asserts a 
certain state]” and the experiential is “ある状態を話し手（疑問文の場合は話し
相手）の感覚で直接にとらえ[...]場合に用いられる[used when the speaker (or 
the listener in interrogative sentences) directly perceives a certain state through 
the senses]” (1975: 4, p. 189 this volume). In addition, Yukawa notes that while in 
most constructions ‘familiarity’ is sufficient to warrant the use of the egophoric, 
the past suffix -pa-yin “このの場合は、 自分の子供であっても、 このいい方を
することはできず， 自分「または自分を含む集団」の行為についてだけ、こ
ういえるのである [can only denote the speaker’s own actions (or those of a group 
to which she belongs) and cannot be used, for example, to refer to the speaker’s 
own child]” (1971: 194). With this observation Yukawa describes what many 
years later Garrett refers to as ‘weak ego’ versus ‘strong ego’ (2001: 178–205) and 
Tournadre refers to as ‘wide scope’ versus ‘narrow scope’ egophoric (2008: 296). 
Similarly, Yukawa shows an awareness of the distribution of evidential forms in 
questions over a decade before DeLancey’s conjunct-disjunct account. Yukawa’s 
contributions have long been overlooked in the English-language literature on 
Tibetan. To rectify this neglect Yukawa’s 1975 article is here republished in English 
translation for the first time. 
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In Japan, Kitamura Hajime continues the third tradition, describing the per-
sonal as encoding what is “psycholinguistically nearer to the speaker” (1977: 25), 
the experiential as “psycholinguistically remote from the speaker” and “which 
the speaker or hearer has ascertained or is ascertaining by his experience” (1977: 
26), and the factual as “generally known facts” (1977: 27).
Some researchers who had described Tibetan evidentials using person agree-
ment or binary feature approaches move towards the three-way morphosyntactic 
contrast as a guide to describing contrasting evidential functions. Twenty years 
after the publication of their textbook, Chang and Chang return to the Lhasa Tibetan 
evidential system with an audience of linguists rather than students in mind. Alt-
hough they do not explicitly characterize the Tibetan system as ‘evidential’, their 
discussion of the personal as “the habitual or customary basis of knowledge which 
has been personally acquired” (1984: 605), the experiential as “witness” (1984: 
619), and the factual as “hearsay” (1984: 605) makes clear that these morphemes 
encode three types of information source. Similarly, Hongladarom moves from a 
binary ‘conjunct-disjunct’ description to describing Tibetan as having:
a three way evidential distinction among yöö [personal], tuu, [experiential] and yôôree [factual] 
indicating the speaker’s self knowledge, direct experience, and indirect source of information 
respectively. (1993: 52, emphasis in original). 
Garrett arrives at the same analysis positing three “evidential categories in Lhasa 
Tibetan—ego [personal], direct [experiential], and indirect [factual]” (2001: x 
et passim). Schwieger (2002: 183) explicitly rejects the association of these evi-
dential categories with agreement. Recent pedagogical grammars also stress 
that the Tibetan system encodes information source and not person agreement 
(Tournadre and Dorje 2003; Chonjore 2003). 
The preoccupation of this discussion has been the general characterization of 
evidentiality in Lhasa Tibetan and an emphasis on the fact that Lhasa has a three 
term evidential system. This structure is most clear in the parallelism between 
the existential verbs yod (personal), ḥdug (experiential), and yod-pa-red (factual) 
and the present tense suffixes -gi-yod (personal), -gi-ḥdug (experiential), and 
-gi-yod-pa-red (factual). Probably one factor that impeded description of this 
system is the opacity of the system’s symmetry in other parts of the verbal system. 
In particular, the placement of the suffixes -yoṅ, -myoṅ, and -byuṅ into the overall 
verbal paradigm requires further study. In their contributions to this volume 
both Hill and Caplow recommend that bźag be analyzed as a perfect experiential 
rather than a separate inferential evidential (as in DeLancey 1985: 65–67, 2003: 
279; Tournadre 1992: 198, 207, 1996: 236–238; Tournadre and Dorje 2009: 140–144, 
410, 413); Hill additionally suggests that the analysis of the semantics of inference 
as a combination of direct evidentiality with perfect tense is a useful framework 
for understanding phenomena in other languages. 
8   Nathan W. Hill and Lauren Gawne
Linguistic meaning is an emergent social practice, which no abstract charac-
terization will fully succeed at capturing. Consequently, the task of describing 
the Lhasa evidential system does not end at realizing the inadequacy of approa-
ches making reference to person or binary features. Instead, the contextual use 
of evidentials in conversation and narration is available for study at any level of 
granularity. Hongladarom (1993) offers a nuanced account of the contrasting use 
of ḥdug and yod-pa-red in conversation. 
1.2  The use of Lhasa Tibetan in typological discussions
The wider typological literature fails to take note of the great majority of the 
research discussed in the previous section. Aikhenvald (2004) cites only works 
by DeLancey and one article by Tournadre (1994). Her lopsided attentiveness is 
characteristic of the citation of Tibetan research articles in the later decades of 
the 20th century and early 21st century; Google Scholar registers 141 citations of 
DeLancey (1986) and 81 citations of Tournadre and Dorje (2003)5 as opposed to 
15 for Hongladarom (1993) and none for Yukawa (1966).6 Because of their influ-
ence, in the context of Tibetan’s impact on the typological literature DeLancey’s 
‘conjunct-disjunct’ (§2.1) and Tournadre’s ‘egophoric’ (§2.2) require treatment in 
detail.
1.2.1 Lhasa Tibetan as a conjunct-disjunct system
The discourse of ‘conjunct-disjunct’ began with an unpublished paper by Austin 
Hale (1971). In the decade before the publication of an updated version (Hale 1980) 
his framework was already influential among missionaries associated with the 
Summer Institute of Linguistics and scholars of Newar (Strahm 1975; Sresthacharya 
et al. 1971; Sresthacarya 1976); the published version (Hale 1980) became the locus 
classicus for this terminology. In this article Hale proposes conjunct-disjunct 
nomenclature for a patterning of verbal suffixes in Kathmandu Newar whereby 
first person declaratives and second person interrogatives are marked the same 
way, in contrast to first person interrogatives, second person declaratives and all 
5 Combining the count for the English and French editions.
6 Google Scholar www.scholar.google.com accessed 29 December 2015.
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third person forms. In (1) the first person verb is differentiated from the second 
and third person forms with a lengthening of the vowel.7 
(1) a. ji ana wanā
‘I went there.’ (conjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 1)
b. cha ana wana
‘You went there.’ (disjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 2)
c. wa wana
‘He went there.’ (disjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 3)
Hale’s description of the system involves three major features. The first is that 
clauses with first person declarative subjects occur with the same form of the verb 
as clauses with second person subjects in question constructions (Hale 1980: 95) 
(cf. (2)).
(2) cha ana wanā lā
‘Did you go there?’ (conjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 4)
The second is that this pattern only holds when the subject is the ‘true instigator’ 
of the action. Impersonal verbs, which the subject has no control over, are never 
marked with a conjunct form (cf. (3)), not even for first person or interrogatives. 
That the ‘disjunct’ is not actually contrasting against anything in this context is 
one of the reasons this terminology is unhelpful.
(3) a. jįį wa saa tāla
‘I heard that noise.’ (disjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 9)
b. chąą wa saa tāla
‘You heard that noise.’ (disjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 9)
c. wąą wa saa tāla
‘He heard that noise.’ (disjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 9)
This dimension of ‘instigator-hood’ means that for verbs other than the imperso-
nal set (where they are always marked disjunct regardless of person) it is possible 
7  In citations from Hale (1980) the emphasis is ours.
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to make a distinction for first person between actions that were done voluntarily 
(cf. (4a)) and those done involuntarily (cf. (4b)) (Hale 1980: 96). This distinction 
is possible because the conjunct form is used exclusively for voluntary actions, as 
discussed above.
(4) a. jįį lā palā
‘I cut the meat (intentionally).’ (conjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 10)
b. jįį lā pala
‘I cut the meat (quite by accident).’ (disjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 11)
The third important feature of Hale’s conjunct-disjunct is the way it interacts with 
indirect quote frames. The two examples below translate the same in English, but 
use different verb forms in Newar and have different co-referential relations. In 
(5) we give Hale’s gloss and also include subscript referent notation.
(5) a. wąą wa ana wanā dhakāā dhāla
‘Hei said that hei went there (himself).’ (conjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 5)
b. wąą wa ana wana dhakāā dhāla
‘Hei said hej (someone else) went there.’ (disjunct) 
(Hale 1980: ex. 6)
The first utterance involves the person saying he went, while the second utte-
rance is a person reporting on another person who went. Hale does not discuss 
how the choice of conjunct versus disjunct forms in these constructions intersect 
with impersonal verbs (cf. (3)), or with non-volitional acts (cf. (4)), but in a later 
treatment Hargreaves (2005: 17) demonstrates that the conjunct-disjunct pattern 
does not hold in such conditions, instead all forms are disjunct.
Six year prior to the publication of Hale’s 1980 study Bendix wrote that (what 
would later be called) the conjunct expresses “the evidential category of intentio-
nal action” (Bendix 1974: 54) and emphasizes it “is evidential and not a first-person 
verb ending: it may occur with any person” (1974: 49). In 1980 Hale cites, but 
makes little use of Bendix’ work. In contrast to Bendix, Hale frames his discussion 
of conjunct-disjunct marking in syntactic terms. Nonetheless, his description of 
the system’s special treatment of the subject as ‘true instigator’ on the one hand 
and the treatment of impersonal verbs on the other hand, make clear that the 
choice of these suffixes is semantically motivated. Although Hale’s ‘conjunct’ and 
‘disjunct’ terminology persists in the treatment of Kathmandu Newar, the defi-
nition of these terms now takes its cue from Bendix. Hargreaves says that con-
junct “suffixes will occur whenever the action is construed as intentional, and the 
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actor/agent is also the evidential source reporting the action” (2003: 376) whereas 
disjunct “suffixes occur in all other finite environments” (2003: 376, also cf. Har-
greaves 2005). Hale’s recent work employs an in extenso quotation from Hargre-
aves as his definition of conjunct and disjunct; the quotation itself cites Bendix 
on the evidential nature of the system (Hale and Shreshta 2006: 55/56). Although 
originally framing his argument around person agreement, Hale now appears to 
agree that the Newar pattern is motivated by evidential semantics. 
It is worth discussing Aikhenvald’s perspective on the Newar verbal system, 
as she analyses both it and Lhasa Tibetan as conjunct-disjunct. Aikhenvald 
describes Newar as having an evidential system of three or more terms (2004: 
291), but 87 pages earlier describes it as displaying “conjunct and disjunct person 
marking” (2004: 204, also see p. 124), a view she repeats in 2012 (p. 471). To say 
that Newar has a conjunct-disjunct system that expresses evidentiality poses no 
contradiction for Hale and Hargreaves, but Aikhenvald rejects the consensus view 
that Newar conjunct-disjunct is evidential marking by another name. Instead, she 
offers a purely syntactic definition of conjunct-disjunct marking8 and contends 
that “[c]onjunct-disjunct person-marking systems are not evidential in nature” 
(2004: 127), a view she reiterates in 2015 with the words “[c]onjunct-disjunct 
systems do not mark information source” (2015: 257), in direct contrast with the 
views of both Hargreaves and Hale.
Citing Hale’s 1980 article, DeLancey first mentions the possibility of consi-
dering Newar conjunct-disjunct marking in connection with the Tibetan verbal 
system (1985: 66, Note 5).9 It was in 1990 that DeLancey first explicitly descri-
bes Tibetan as exhibiting a conjunct-disjunct system. He offers examples (6a–d) 
to show both that first person declaratives and second person interrogatives are 
marked the same way and that second person declaratives and first person inter-
rogatives are marked the same way (corresponding to Hale’s first feature).10
8 She defines conjunct-disjunct marking as “person-marking on the verb whereby first person 
subject in statements is expressed in the same way as second person in questions, and all other 
persons are marked in a different way (also used to describe cross clausal co-reference)” (2004: 
391). More recently she concedes that person marking “may correlate with speaker’s control in 
conjunct-disjunct [...] person-marking systems” (2015: 257, Note 17), i.e. in her view we paradoxi-
cally see here a person-marking system that does not mark person.
9 In an article published the following year (1986) he does not reiterate this observation, making 
no mention of ‘conjunct-disjunct’; puzzlingly, it is this 1986 paper that Aikhenvald cites to claim 
that conjunct-disjunct agreement has nothing to do with evidentiality (2004: 127, 2015: 257).
10 DeLancey was by no means the first scholar to note the patterning of first person declaratives 
with second person interrogatives in Tibetan; this pattern was known at least as early as Yukawa 
(1966: 77). 
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(6) a. ṅa   bod-pa    yin 
I      Tibetan   be.per
‘I am a Tibetan.’ 
 b. kho   bod-pa    red
He     Tibetan   be.fac
‘He is Tibetan.’
 c. khyed-raṅ   bod-pa    yin-pas
You               Tibetan   be.per.interr
‘Are you a Tibetan?’
 d.  ṅa    rgya-mi    red-pas
1sg   Chinese   be.fac.interr
‘Am I Chinese?’ 
(DeLancey 1990: 295)
DeLancey also points to the Tibetan distinction between first person actions done 
voluntarily (cf. (7a)) and those done involuntarily (cf. (7b)). Thus, the Tibetan 
evidentials also satisfy Hale’s second feature. 
(7) a. ṅas dkar-yol bcag-pa-yin 
1sg cup broke.pst.per
‘I broke the cup (intentionally).’
 b. ṅas dkar-yol bcag-soṅ
1sg cup broke.pst.tes
‘I broke the cup (unintentionally).’ 
(DeLancey 1990: 300)
He offers examples (8a–d) to show the way that interactions with indirect quote 
frames parallel those of Newar as in Hale’s third feature.
(8) a. khos kho bod-pa yin
3sg.m.erg 3sg.m Tibetan be.per
‘He is Tibetan.’
 b. khos kho bod-pa yin zer-gyis
3sg.m.erg 3sg.m Tibetan be.per say.ipfv
‘Heᵢ says 3sg.mᵢ is Tibetan.’
 c. khos kho bod-pa red zer-gyis
3sg.m.erg 3sg.m Tibetan be.fac say.ipfv
‘Heᵢ says heⱼ is Tibetan.’
 d. khos              ṅa     bod-pa    red         zer-gyis
3sg.m.erg   1sg   Tibetan   be.fac   say.ipfv
‘He says I am Tibetan.’ 
(DeLancey 1990: 295/296)
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Although DeLancey has not distanced himself from Hale’s 1980 presentation 
of conjunct-disjunct as explicitly as Hale himself has, DeLancey’s approach 
to describing Tibetan with ‘conjunct-disjunct’ terminology has changed over 
time. First, DeLancey never committed himself to Aikhenvald’s assertion that 
conjunct-disjunct is person agreement and categorically not evidential marking. 
Most explicitly in 2003 he rejects her account by referring to conjunct-disjunct 
as a “particular evidential pattern” (2003: 278). Earlier he referred to the Lhasa 
Tibetan verbal system as an “evidential system” (1990: 304) and “problema-
tic as an example of verb agreement” (1992: 43). Second, he has begun to use 
Tournadre’s ‘egophoric’ terminology in addition to Hale’s ‘conjunct-disjunct’. 
Citing personal communication with DeLancey in 2003, Tournadre claims that 
with regard to Tibetan DeLancey had been “convinced that the notion of ‘ego-
phoric’ […] was more appropriate than the opposition conjunct/disjunct” (2008: 
284, Note 6). In print DeLancey has not embraced ‘egophoric’ in favour of 
‘conjunct-disjunct’, but recently he treats the two frameworks as interchangea-
ble, writing of “‘conjunct-disjunct’ or ‘egophoric’ systems” (2012: 550, 2015: 64). 
The framework of ‘conjunct-disjunct’ is not popular among other researchers 
on Tibetan. Sun refers to the terms as “utterly unrevealing” (1993: 995). Garrett 
sees their use in reference to Lhasa Tibetan as “regrettable” pointing out that 
“for a language like Tibetan, in which the evidential opposition is ternary […] 
rather than binary, as in Newari, two terms do not suffice” (2001: 209, Note 66). 
Tournadre (2008) devotes an entire study to rejecting ‘conjunct-disjunct’; he 
notes his argument’s “implications for typological studies” (2008: 284), and sket-
ches the ramifications of such a rejection on Aikhenvald’s evidential typology. In 
his contribution to this volume Tournadre elaborates that Aikhenvald
has set up conjunct/disjunct marking and evidentiality as categorically different in nature 
whereas at least for the Tibetic languages, ‘conjunct/disjunct’ was just a provisional and inap-
propriate description of evidential phenomena. (Tournadre, p. 118 this volume). 
Tournadre’s remarks provide a convenient juncture for the exploration of 
Aikhenvald’s treatment of Lhasa Tibetan. 
Paradoxically Aikhenvald describes Lhasa Tibetan ḥdug (experiential) as 
both a “disjunct copula” (2004: 127) and a morpheme that “marks ‘actual visual 
knowledge’” (2004: 284). If as she contends, “[c]onjunct-disjunct person-marking 
systems are not evidential in nature” (2004: 127, cf. 12, 146, 276), then a single 
morpheme cannot be both disjunct and evidential. Her inconsistent treatment 
of ḥdug reflects an ambivalence as to whether Lhasa Tibetan exhibits evidential 
marking (2004: 14, 28, 69) or conjunct-disjunct agreement (2004: 127, 134). This 
ambivalence persists into 2012, but perhaps with her inclining in favor of person. 
She hesitantly finds Tibetan evidentiality plausible.
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The case for ḥdug as a marker of information source appears to be likely […] However, to make 
it fully convincing, it needs to be placed within the context of a full grammar of a language. 
(2012: 467)
She expresses dissatisfaction with Denwood’s (1999) treatment, but does not 
draw on the full grammars of Kitamura (1977), M. Hoshi (1988), Chonjore (2003), 
nor Garrett’s (2001) thesis etc., which all discuss the evidential nature of the 
Tibetan system. Her skepticism regarding ḥdug is curious, given that very few of 
the languages treated in her 2004 monograph are as well researched as Tibetan.11 
Most recently, in 2015, she reiterates both the view that Tibetan has conjunct-dis-
junct person marking (2015b: 257, Note 17) and the view that “[c]onjunct-disjunct 
systems do not mark information source” (2015b: 257)”, but remains silent on 
Tibetan evidentiality. 
In addition to Newar and Lhasa Tibetan, the terminology of conjunct-disjunct 
has appeared in the description of the Jirel (Strahm 1975), Sherpa (Schöttelndreyer 
1980; Woodbury 1986; Kelly 2004), and Lhomi (Vesalainen and Vesalainen 1980) 
varieties of Tibetan, as well as Awa Pit and other Barbacoan languages (Curnow 
2002a, 2002b),12 Kaike (Watters 2006), Duna (San Roque 2008: 425), and Yong-
ning Na languages (Lidz 2010: 14, 373–381). How closely an author draws com-
parison to Hale’s description of Newar, and whether he or she characterizes 
‘conjunct-disjunct’ in a particular language as syntactic agreement or semanti-
cally based evidential choices, of course, varies case to case. In general, as in the 
case of Newar, earlier descriptions (e.g. Schöttelndreyer 1980) are syntactic in 
approach, but more recent descriptions, such as Watters’ of Kaike emphasize that 
“‘person’ is not the primary motivating factor behind the system, but rather, ‘voli-
tionality’ and ‘locus of knowledge’” (2006: 300). It is likely that the authors of the 
older more syntactic descriptions would now reformulate their presentation in 
light of more recent research. Even among the older descriptions, a definition of 
the conjunct as meaning that there is “an experiencer […] who has been closely 
involved with the event of the main verb” (Vesalainen and Vesalainen 1980: 27) 
is more similar to Tournadre’s description of the egophoric than to any type of 
person agreement.
11 In the same 2012 article in which she holds high the bar for Lhasa’s ḥdug as a marker of infor-
mation source, Aikhenvald posits le as a mirative marker in Balti Tibetan on the basis of Bashir’s 
(2010) treatment of a mere two examples.
12 Dickinson’s (2000) description of Tsafiki essentially uses the ‘conjunct-disjunct’ approach, 
although she uses the terminology ‘congruent’ and ‘noncongruent’. 
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1.2.2 Lhasa Tibetan egophoric evidentiality
DeLancey’s current identification of ‘conjunct-disjunct’ with ‘egophoric’ makes 
good sense in the context of Tournadre’s initial coining of the term ‘egophoric’. 
In 1992, Tournadre contrasts the “égophoriques” (personal) and “hétéropho-
riques” (experiential-factual) auxiliaries (1992: 197), dividing the latter between 
“constatif” (experiential) and “assertif” (factual) (1992: 207).13 In subsequent 
publications “hétérophoriques” became “hétérophorique ou neutre” (1994: 
151), and “neutres” (1996: 220). By 2001 he had cast off the binary perspective, 
describing “egophoric”, “sensorial”, and “assertive” as equal evidential cate-
gories (Tournadre and Jiatso 2001: 72). From then on DeLancey’s ‘conjunct’ and 
Tournadre’s ‘egophoric’ parted ways. For Tournadre ‘egophoric’ refers to a speci-
fic evidential category in Lhasa Tibetan, a category that this introduction refers 
to as ‘personal’ (as in Hill 2012, 2013a) and others call ‘participant specific’ (Agha 
1993: 157) or ‘self-centered’ (Denwood 1999). See Gawne (this volume) for further 
discussion of egophoric/personal in Lhasa Tibetan as well as other Tibetan 
varieties. 
The personal (egophoric) is used in Lhasa Tibetan if the speaker of a decla-
rative sentence draws on her own personal information about something closely 
associated with her or her intentions. The following examples (9a–f) contrast 
the semantics of the personal with the factual (cf. (10a+b)) and experiential (cf. 
(10c–f)).14 
(9) a. ṅa rdo-rje yin 
I, me Dorje be-per
  ‘I’m Dorje.’ (introducing oneself to a stranger)
b. kho ṅaḥi bu yin 
he I, me-gen son, child be-per
   ‘He is my son.’ (emphasizing his relationship to me, e.g. answering 
‘whose son is he?’) 
c. ṅar deb ḥdi yod 
I, me-dat book this be-per
‘I own this book.’ (seeing the book on a friend’s table)
13 Tournadre’s use of ‘egophoric’ differs profoundly from its meaning for Hagège (1982) or Dahl 
(2000).
14 These examples are adapted from Hongladarom (1993: 112), Schwieger (2002) and Hill (2013a). 
One could equally offer experiential equivalents of 10a-b, viz. ḥdi ṅa red-bźag ‘(I now see that) 
this is me’ and kho ṅaḥi bu red-bźag ‘(I now see that) he is my son.’
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d. kha-lag ḥdi źim-po yod 
food this tasty be-per
‘This food is tasty.’ (I find that it tastes good)
e. ṅa na-gi-yod 
me sick-prs-per
‘I’m (chronically) sick.’ 
f. ṅa-tsho yar ḥgro-gi-yod 
we yonder go-prs-per
‘We are going over there.’ 
g. dge-rgan-gyis bod-yig bslab gnaṅ-gi-yod 
teacher-agn Tibetan script teach do-prs-per
‘The teacher teaches (me) Tibetan script.’ 
(10) a. ḥdi ṅa red
this me be-fac
‘This is me.’ (presenting a group picture indicating one’s place in a 
crowd)
b. kho ṅaḥi bu red
he I, me-gen son, child be-fac
‘He is my son.’ (emphasizing his correct identification, e.g. answering 
‘who is he’?)
c. ṅar deb gcig ḥdug 
I, me-dat book this be-tes
‘(Oh,) there is a book for me.’ (looking in an office pigeonhole)
c. kha lag ḥdi źim-po ḥdug 
food this tasty be-tes
‘This food is tasty.’ (I know, because I am tasting it) 
d. ṅa na-gi-ḥdug 
me sick-prs-tes
‘I’m sick (at the moment).’
e. ṅa-tsho yar ḥgro-gi-ḥdug 
we yonder go-prs-tes
‘(In my dream) we were going over there’.
f. ṅa bod-yig slob-sbyoṅ byed-gi-ḥdug 
me Tibetan script study do-prs-tes
‘(In this scene of the home movie) I am studying the Tibetan script.’
These examples make abundantly clear that person agreement or its adaptation as 
‘conjunt-disjunct’ has no explanatory value. The personal is perfectly compatible 
with third person (examples (9a, d, g)) and the first person is perfectly compatible 
with the experiential (examples (10a, c, d, e, f)). The supposed correlation of the 
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personal evidence (egophoric) with first person subject is simply specious. Thus, 
“the coreference concepts of conjunct and disjunct are not appropriate” and 
instead the “semantic and pragmatic notion of ‘egophoric’ related to ‘personal 
knowledge’ […] is better suited to interpret the linguistic facts” (Tournadre 2008: 
304). 
The Lhasa Tibetan personal evidential category has echoes in categories 
described for languages from other parts of the world (Loughnane 2009: 249–253; 
San Roque and Loughnane 2012: 157/158), some of which also passed through 
a phase of misidentification as person agreement or ‘conjunct’ marking. For 
example, W. M. Rule describes that when he and his wife
first analysed the Foe language [of Papua New Ginea], we had this 1st [participatory] aspect 
classified as a 1st pers. subject-verb agreement […] It was not until later, when we came across 
numbers of examples of sentences wherein the 1st aspect was used for actions which a 3rd 
person/s were doing […] that I realised that the basic relationship was not between subject & 
the verb, but between the speaker & the verb. (Rule 1977: 71). 
With the Lhasa and Foe cases in mind, it is clear that intensive language docu-
mentation needs to consider the interactional uses of grammatical forms in a 
range of interactional contexts.15 In addition, whereas a contextualized example 
of evidential usage found in natural discourse is a fact to reckon with, grammati-
cality judgments are fallible opinions. For example, misled by the artificiality of 
elicitation, DeLancey (1990: 300) and Bartee (2011: 143) report that example (9e) 
(above) is ungrammatical.16 Their example stands as a warning that readers must 
“feel entitled to explicitly doubt a direct statement about a language by someone 
who actually knows something about it” (DeLancey 2012: 538).
Aikhenvald does not discuss a category of personal (egophoric) evidentiality. 
Remarking that “complex evidentiality systems may involve further terms” (2004: 
60), she mentions several of the relevant categories including the Foe “partici-
patory” and the Kashaya “performative” (2004: 60–62), but these languages do 
not influence her typology (2004: 65) nor does she draw parallels between these 
categories and evidential usage in Newar and Lhasa Tibetan.17
15 One is entitled to wonder whether more intensive language documentation and compre-
hensive study will disprove observations such as that the “conjunct” of Awa Pit is “entirely 
person-based” (Curnow 2002a: 616) or that in sentences marked with the Kashaya “performative” 
the subject “is always the first person” (Oswalt 1986: 34). Subtle evidential nuances are hard to elicit.
16 Tournadre (1992: 203) appears to be the first to have reported example 9e. 
17 Her more recent work (2012: 471, 2015: 257, Note 17) merely reiterates her long held opinions 
and reveals a lack of awareness of relevant work such as Tournadre (2008) and Loughnane 
(2009: 249–253).
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In other quarters Tournadre’s rejection of ‘conjunct-disjunct’ terminology 
has garnered attention and egophoric terminology is now proliferating among 
younger scholars (Post 2013; Daudey 2014a, 2014b; Knuchel 2015).18 Nonetheless, 
closer scrutiny reveals Tournadre’s insights have attracted fewer adherents than 
his terminology. In particular, the old analysis lives on in the -ity of ‘egophori-
city’, a term Mark Post coined (2013: 107, 119, 127). He explicitly identifies the old 
outlook with the new term, referring to “person-sensitive T[ense]A[spect]M[ood]
E[videntiality] marking in Lhasa Tibetan – ‘a.k.a conjunct-disjunct marking’ 
or ‘egophoricity’” (2013: 107), unaware that the Lhasa personal (egophoric) is 
insensitive to person. Daudey reveals an unambiguous misunderstanding of 
Tournadre’s position by referring to “evidentiality versus egophoricity” (2014a: 
344) and incorrectly claiming that the “term egophoricity is used by Tournadre 
(2008)” (2014a: 358, Note 349). Knuchel likewise contradicts Tournadre’s per-
spective at the same time as adopting his terminology. 
I opt for using Tournadre’s (1991; 1996) term egophoric, with the contrasting non-egophoric 
where applicable. Egophoricity serves as the generic term for the category and egophoric con-
trast is used to include both values, egophoric and nonegophoric. (Knuchel 2015: 2 emphasis 
in original). 
In an attempt to communicate ambivalence between the ‘conjunct-disjunct’ and 
‘egophoric’ outlooks, San Roque et al. point out both that some have “proposed 
that egophoric markers are a special evidential category of ‘ego’ evidentiality” 
(2017: 137) and that by others “an ‘information source’ interpretation has been 
explicitly rejected” (2017: 137/138). Their formulation of “the phenomenon of 
egophoricity (conjunct/disjunct marking)” as “a typological category that has 
been closely linked to evidentiality” (2017: 122) reveals that they reject Tournadre’s 
perspective. They identify ‘conjunct/disjunct’ and ‘egophoricity’ whereas Tournadre 
(2008) rejects this identification. Furthermore, if the personal (egophoric) is an 
evidential category, then to say that it is ‘linked’ to evidentiality is as confused as 
saying the House of Representatives maintains links to the US Government. In their 
efforts to weigh the merits of the two schools of thought San Roque et al. again 
betray a proclivity for Aikhenvald’s perspective by not considering egophoric 
evidentiality to be on the same footing as ‘classic’ evidential morphemes.
the view that egophoricity is a type of evidentiality is especially compelling for languages where 
ego markers contrast paradigmatically with ‘classic’ evidential morphemes such as visual and 
18 In a clear case, Post previously described Galo as having “a conjunct/disjunct system” (2007: 611), 
but later concludes that “it would seem appropriate to adopt Tournadre’s terminology” (2013: 111). 
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other sensory markers … However, for some egophoric languages there is less motivation for 
an evidential interpretation, as information source is not (otherwise) grammaticalised. (San 
Roque et al. 2017: 138, emphasis in original)
In claiming that egophoric marking which fails to contrast with ‘classic’ eviden-
tial morphemes provides less motivation for an evidential interpretation, they 
cling too firmly to existing typologies that fail to mention personal (egophoric) 
evidentiality.19 If it is sensible to analyze some languages as exhibiting personal 
evidentiality, then the personal merits to stand among other evidential categories 
with cross-linguistic evidence of reoccurring semantics. The field of evidential 
typology has too long overlooked personal evidence. This volume provides ample 
evidence of this category, and its variation in a group of related languages. 
The overall pattern of defining ‘egophoric(ity)’ in relation to Hale’s (1980) 
definition of ‘conjunct-disjunct’ and then providing qualifications (Post 2013; 
Daudey 2014a, 2014b) repeatedly breathes fresh air into a defunct outlook and 
fulfills Tournadre’s prophecy that “the phantom concept of conjunct/disjunct 
will haunt linguistic articles for a long time” (Tournadre 2008: 304). In his 
contribution to the current volume, Tournadre attempts to rectify the misunder-
standings of his work, by again rejecting the view that egophoric and non-egophoric 
are contrasting members of a single category:
the term ‘egophoric’ … never referred to a system but to a specific category of the Evidential/ 
Epistemic system, used with many other categories. (Tournadre, p. 116 this volume, emphasis 
in original) 
The application of the term ‘egophoricity’ and references to ‘egophoric systems’ is a 
hindrance to the understanding of the specific evidential forms in Tibetan varieties 
and analogous phenomena in other languages. In sum, those whom Tournadre con-
vinced to drop ‘conjunct-disjunct’ should abstain from putting -ity on the egophoric.
Perhaps Tournadre’s term ‘egophoric’ is partly to blame for engendering the 
misunderstandings of his perspective. The term has several disadvantages. First, 
it has been used for other purposes (by Hagège 1982 and Dahl 2000). Second, its 
derivative ‘egophoricity’ has become identical with ‘conjunct-disjunct’ (by Post 
2013, Daudey 2014a, 2014b, Knuchel 2015, and San Roque et al. 2017). Third, as 
it contains the word ‘ego’, the first person singular subject pronoun of Greek and 
Latin, it will always imply first person. For these reasons this introduction prefers 
‘personal’. 
19 To speak of ‘egophoric languages’ is odd, since one does not speak of ‘aorist languages’ or 
‘imperfective languages’ but rather ‘tense languages’ and ‘aspect languages’.
20   Nathan W. Hill and Lauren Gawne
1.3 The study of other Tibetan varieties
As far as we are able to determine all Tibetan varieties exhibit grammaticalized 
evidentiality. In contrast to the extensive literature on Lhasa Tibetan evidentia-
lity, comparatively little work has been done on other varieties. Some of this work 
appears in broader descriptive grammars, and may only obliquely make reference 
to the evidential categories of a particular language. However, specific studies of 
evidential systems are increasingly appearing (e.g. Sun 1993; Shao 2014). In this 
section we summarize the existing literature on evidentiality in Tibetan varieties 
beyond Lhasa, for this purpose it is convenient to treat languages in a rough geo-
graphic sweep from west to east. There is no reason to think that the geographic 
divisions correspond to stemmatic clades. We have attempted to be as compre-
hensive as possible in terms of the languages covered in this section, however 
with regards to each language we have not indicated the complete range of refe-
rences available. This is particularly the case in regard to languages that have 
chapters in this book. We direct the reader to each chapter for a more detailed 
background on the literature regarding that language. The contributions of this 
volume are mentioned in turn under the appropriate geographic heading. In 
addition, two of our contributors offer cross-variety studies. Gawne compares the 
expression of personal evidentiality (“egophoric”) in a suite of Tibetan varieties. 
Ebihara, taking her departure from form rather than meaning, explores the uses 
of cognates of snaṅ across varieties. 
1.3.1 Western varieties
Balti is one of the first Tibetan varieties for which evidentiality was described. 
Read underlines the evidential opposition between yodpa and yodsuk as respec-
tively “hearsay” and “seen by the speaker” (1934: 41). He also highlights eviden-
tial uses of the copula verbs when used with adjectives: yod “suggests personal 
experience” whereas in lacks this connotation (1934: 36). Read also describes in 
as an auxiliary verb in the formation of the perfect as used with the first person 
“on most occasions” (1934: 45), a description redolent of personal evidentiality. 
With this early account of Read’s in mind, it is surprising that Tournadre and 
LaPolla (2014: 254, Note 27) cite Bielmeier (2000) as saying that Balti dialect does 
not mark evidentiality. Although Bielmeier does not use the term ‘evidentiality’ in 
his article, his treatment of ‘semantic-pragmatic effects’ is clearly about eviden-
tiality. For example, his description of jot [yod] as indicating “subjective definite 
knowledge, acquired through previous personal experience” (2001: 56), refers 
very clearly to personal evidentiality. In his earlier monograph Bielmeier (1985) 
 1 The contribution of Tibetan languages to the study of evidentiality   21
presents a number of paired verb tenses in which one of the two indicates visual 
information source (e.g. Imperfekt v. Beobachtetes Imperfekt, Duratives Präteri-
tum v. Beobachtetes duratives Präteritum, Nezessitatives Präteritum v. Beobach-
tetes nezessitatives Präteritum). In all cases, the addition of a suffix -suk marks 
the ‘Beobachtetes’ [‘observed’] member of the pair. Jones (2009) devotes a study 
to the experiential suffixes -suk and -naŋ. In the current volume Ebihara discus-
ses evidential uses of snaṅ in Balti Tibetan among other varieties. 
In Ladakhi, Francke (1901) presents most of those affixes which later authors 
regard as evidential, but rarely draws attention to their evidential meaning. 
However, he does remark that -rag “can only be used with verbs which denote a 
perception of the senses (with the exception of sight) or an action of the intellect” 
(1901: 29). Like other authors of his time period, he frequently sees evidentiality 
through the lens of grammatical person, e.g. remarking that -pin “is very much 
used in lively conversation, rather more for the first and second persons than for 
the third” (1901: 30), and noting an association of the third person with the suffixes 
-song and -tog (1901: 30/31). Koshal offers a complex presentation of the Ladakhi 
verbal system. In this account the Ladakhi verbal template is composed of a verb 
stem, an optional modal suffix, and is completed with a ‘tense-aspect-orientation’ 
suffix (1979: 193), in which ‘orientation’ may be understood as equivalent to evi-
dential. The paradigm of ‘tense-aspect-orientation’ markers includes 33 forms 
(1979: 295–313). Koshal does not organize these 33 forms into subcategories.20 In a 
pedagogical grammar, Norman (2001: 52/53) describes seven evidential or modal 
settings for the present tense (-at already known to the speaker, -duk seen, -rak felt 
or sensed, -anok general, -at-ḍo probably, -at-kyak inferred, and -chen indefinite) 
20 Koshal’s terminology for individual forms, e.g. “observed present continuous” (1979: 195) 
generally implies a categorization of the 33 forms into large categories, but this categorization 
is not seen through explicitly. In a typological work, Bhat, relying entirely on Koshal, describes 
Ladakhi as having six epistemic moods, viz. reported, observed, experienced, inferred, probable, 
and generic (1999: 72), four inference distinctions, and two narrative suffixes (1999: 73). Relying 
on Koshal (1979) and Bhat (1999), Aikhenvald describes Ladakhi as exhibiting “four evidentiality 
specifications”, namely reported, observed, experienced (e.g. by feeling), and inferred (2004: 
211). One is left to infer that Aikhenvald’s radical simplification is based on Bhat’s comment 
regarding the epistemic moods that “the first four suffixes are primarily evidential in nature and 
only the last two can be regarded as involving judgment” (1999: 72). Thus, rather than empiri-
cally consulting Ladakhi to formulate her typology, Aikhenvald makes her assumption that “ex-
pressing an appropriate information source and choosing the correct marking for it, has nothing 
to do with one’s ‘epistemic stance’, point of view, or personal reliability” (2004: 5) a Procrustean 
bed in which she makes Ladakhi lie. One may also note that for Koshal the ‘reportive’ past is 
“based on direct and definite knowledge” (1979: 197). Thus, Bhat and Aikhenvald have radically 
misreported Koshal’s description, distracted by a specious resemblance of terminology.
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and four for the past tense (-pin performed by speaker, -Ø seen, -tok unseen, and 
-kyak inferred). In the Jakobsonian tradition, Zeisler describes a binary contrast 
between ‘non-experiential knowledge’ marked with yot and ‘experiential know-
ledge’ marked by duk, but proceeds to draw a further distinction within ‘experien-
tial knowledge’ between visual evidence marked by duk and other sense evidence 
marked by rak (2004: 650). She places additional ‘inferential markers’ (-ok) and 
‘distance markers’ (-suk, -kyak) outside of this system (2004: 653). 
In contrast to the cases of Balti and Ladakhi, researchers have been slow to 
recognize evidentiality in Purik. Bailey’s (1920) Purik sketch grammar makes no 
reference to evidentially or person agreement. In their function as auxiliaries of 
durative aspect Rangan describes jot and duk as respectively indexing first person 
and second/third person (1979: 87/88). This description of Purik evidentiality as 
person persists into the 21st century. According to Bielmeier (2000) the existential 
jot “occurs in statements where the speaker plays a role as participant […] but not 
as subject” (2000: 87) and duk is used “in sentences where the speaker does not 
play a syntactico-semantic role as participant” (2000: 89). Sharma (2004) effectively 
repeats Rangan’s description of jot and duk as auxiliaries, using the terminology “first 
person” and “non-first person” (2004: 94) but he adds the caveat that this distribu-
tion is “not adhered to strictly” (2004: 94/95). In this context, where the sophistica-
tion of analysis lags far behind that of descriptions of other Tibetan varieties, Zemp’s 
detailed discussion of Purik evidentiality in the current volume is trail blazing.
1.3.2 Central varieties
Using Hale’s (1971) ‘conjunct-disjunct’ paradigm, missionaries associated with 
the Summer Institute of Linguistics described the evidential systems of several 
Central Tibetan varieties spoken in Nepal, viz. Jirel (Strahm 1975), Sherpa (Schöt-
telndreyer 1980), and Lhomi (Vesalainen and Vesalainen 1980). As mentioned 
earlier, these early descriptions (e.g. Schöttelndreyer 1980) are generally syn-
tactic in approach, but even among these older descriptions, a definition of the 
conjunct as meaning that there is “an experiencer … who has been closely invol-
ved with the event of the main verb” (Vesalainen and Vesalainen 1980: 27) reflects 
personal evidentiality much more than any type of person agreement.
Sherpa received further attention in an article by Woodbury (1986), exploring 
the interaction of evidentiality and tense in lexical verb marking. He provides a 
very different account to the binary-focused conjunct-disjunct analysis presented 
in Schöttelndreyer (1980). Woodbury argues that the Sherpa form nok is used as a 
visual sensory evidential in the present tense (glossing with ‘I see, have seen…’) 
and an inferential evidential in the past (glossing with ‘I hear, I infer…’). In the 
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past, the form suŋ instead has sensory semantics. These two uses of nok can be 
attributed to it being used for ‘immediate evidence’, either evidence of the event 
itself taking place in the present, or the evidence of the aftermath of an event that 
allows the speaker to make an inferential claim. Woodbury also discusses nok as 
a future inferential, and wi as a ‘gnomic’, glossed with ‘It is known’. Kelly (2004) 
draws on both traditions, outlining the semantics of each specific Sherpa eviden-
tial form, while also noting how it would be distributed in a conjunct/disjunct 
analysis. She discusses the ĩ verb suffix as a ‘first-person conjunct’ marking “a 
volitionally instigated event as having been directly experienced by a speaker” 
(Kelly 2004: 250). The form suŋ is a ‘disjunct’ used to “mark an event as having 
been directly witnessed by a speaker” (Kelly 2004: 250). Like Woodbury, Kelly 
(2004: 251/252) notes that nok can be used either as a visual sensory or inferen-
tial, but argues that instead of a tense-based distinction it is aspectual, with the 
sensory function in imperfective contexts and the inferential function in the per-
fective. Finally Kelly gives wi as gnomic (2004: 253), marking accepted ideas of 
how things happen. Tournadre et al. organize the evidential suffixes of Sherpa 
into paradigms. In their analysis in Sherpa “as in other Tibetic languages, there 
are three main types of evidentials: factual i.e., general or factual information, 
sensory [experiential] i.e., testimonial information (whereby the speaker is a 
witness), and egophoric [personal] i.e., based on the speaker’s personal informa-
tion” (Tournadre et al. 2009: 271 emphasis in original).
Kretschmar gives a very detailed description of the Tibetan dialect of South 
Mustang, but because she does not present an overview of the verbal paradigm 
it is difficult to gain an overall impression of the system. Her most clear descrip-
tion of evidentiality is in discussion of the copula verbs, which, as in all other 
Tibetan varieties, also serve as affixes in the verbal system. In her description the 
copulas distinguish only two evidential categories. The essential copulas rak has 
“einen stärker konstatierenden Charakter [a strong reporting character]” (1995: 
109) whereas with jin “ein stärkeres persönliches Engagement zum Ausdruck 
kommt [a stronger personal committement is expressed]” (1995: 109). The exis-
tential copulas ö and its equivalent öka rak express “persönliche Überzeugung 
[personal conviction]” whereas duk and its equivalent öta rak express “perönlich 
bezeugtes Wissen [personally certain knowledge]” (1995: 109). 
In Melamchi Valley Yolmo, Hari presents the copula verbs in a table with a 
basic two-way distinction between “old or general knowledge” and “mirative/infe-
rential forms” (2010: 63). She breaks down old or general knowledge further with 
‘yihn being used for “truth, emphasized” and ‘yeh considered “neutral” (2010: 73). 
It is possible that the ‘truth’ that is being invoked in Hari’s description is driven by 
a speaker’s personal knowledge. Gawne (2014) argues that ye and yin (yìmba in 
the Lamjung variety) are egophoric (personal), although without the restriction on 
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speaker relationship to subject that the Lhasa personal sometimes involves. The 
morpheme dù (Hari’s ‘mirative/inferential’) is more prototypically a sensory evi-
dential like its Lhasa Tibetan cognate. Hari (2010: 51) and Gawne (2014) also note 
that Yolmo has a general fact òŋge, which is not attested in other Tibetan varieties. 
Central Tibetan varieties spoken inside of Tibet have received somewhat less 
attention than those of Nepal. Kretschmar (1986) describes the Drokpa dialect 
spoken in South West Tibet. She recognizes the same three evidential categories, 
personal, experiential, and factual, now familiar to the reader. In her account yin 
/jin/ (personal) “drückt das persönliche Engagement, die innere Regung des Spre-
chers aus [expresses a personal commitment to the inner emotion of the speaker]” 
(1986: 65) and ḥdug /tuk/ (experiential) expresses “die persönliche Kenntnis 
eines Geschehens [the personal knowledge of an event]” (1986: 65). The five suffi-
xes /ö’/, /re’/, /ö:re’/, /te:/, /ö:te:/ “dienen zur Kennzeichnung einer allgemeinen 
Feststellung und zu distanzierter Beschreibung und werden ohne Unterschied 
gebraucht [are used to identify a general statement and distanced description 
and are used indiscriminately]” (1986: 65). It is surprising to see /ö’/ (presuma-
bly yod) among the factual suffixes. In addition, from a structural perspective 
the description of five suffixes with identical value is not possible. Hermann 
(1989) describes the Dingri dialect without making explicit reference to eviden-
tiality. Her reference to grammatical person necessitates a ‘conjunt-disjunct’ 
style of presentation, although she shows no awareness of this tradition. The 
many details of its verbal system that resembles Lhasa, e.g. the formation of the 
present with -ri ö̜: (ki-yod) and -ki-tuk (-ki-ḥdug) and a “beobachtendes Präteritum 
[witnessing preterite]” formed with -tšhuṅ (byuṅ) and soṅ (soṅ) (1989: 72) succor 
an impression that this variety does encode evidential distinctions in its verbal 
system. Unfortunately, it is precisely in those aspects where the system least 
resembles Lhasa that the evidential components of its verbal system are most 
unclear. Haller (2000: 89) describes Shigatse as exhibiting three evidential cate-
gories, viz. volitional evidential, non-volitional evidential, and non-evidential, 
respectively cognate with the Lhasa personal, experiential, and factual.21 Huber 
offers a description of Kyirong evidentiality (2005) in the tradition of binary 
feature opposition. Citing DeLancey (1986), she bifurcates the evidential settings 
into old and new knowledge (2005: 98).22 Under ‘old knowledge’ she includes 
21 Note that this three-way contrast and the terminology for it he exactly repeats in his descrip-
tion of the Themchen dialect of Amdo (Haller 2004: 137).
22 By describing ‘old knowledge’ and ‘new knowledge’ under the general rubric of ‘evidentiality’ 
(2005: 97), Huber makes clear that she disagrees with DeLancey’s subsequent writings in which 
he sets up ‘mirativity’ in opposition to ‘evidentiality’ (1997, also cf. Hill 2012). 
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‘generic knowledge’ and ‘personal experience’; under ‘new information’ she 
includes ‘direct sensory evidence’ and ‘inference’. Huber does not justify the 
grouping together of these four evidential categories under the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
rubrics on morphosyntactic grounds. A simpler and equally accurate account 
would flatten the description to four evidential categories of the same level. In 
general all four evidential options are available in each tense,23 e.g. the imperfec-
tive distinguishes -kẽ̄: (generic knowledge), -ko-jø: (personal experience), -ko-nu: 
(direct sensory evidence), and -kojobajimbɛ (indirect evidence). The functional 
correspondence of the first three evidentials to the Lhasa factual, personal, and 
experiential is clear. However, the ‘indirect’ category is particular to Kyirong.
Denjongke, the Tibetan variety of Sikkim, has received very little study. Both 
in their use as present and future auxiliaries and in their use as copula verbs, 
Sandberg associates ‘in with first person and be’/du’ with second and third (1888: 
19–21, 1895: 40–44). In the current volume, Yliniemi gives the first comprehensive 
treatment of Denjongke copulas and their evidential values. 
Among the Tibetan varieties spoken in Bhutan, only Dzongkha is relatively 
well described. The early description of Dzongkha by Byrne (1909) is not currently 
available to us. In a much more recent work on Dzongkha, van Driem contrasts 
two evidential values, viz. “old, ingrained background knowledge which is or has 
become a firmly integrated part of one’s conception of reality” typical of the equa-
tive copula ‘ing and the existential copula yö, versus “knowledge which has been 
newly acquired” (1998: 127), typical of the equative copula ‘immä and the exis-
tential copula dû. To identify this distinction with DeLancey’s ‘mirativity’ (1997, 
2001) would misunderstand van Driem profoundly (see van Driem 2015: 8/9). Van 
Driem describes the structural meaning of a language-internal contrast, whereas 
DeLancey imagines a typological category of crosslinguistic validity, and one 
distinct from evidentiality. In the current volume, Hyslop and Tshering further 
illustrate the evidential contrasts of Dzongkha. Although their analysis is funda-
mentally compatible with van Driem’s they seek a terminology more in keeping 
with the Zeitgeist of functional and typological linguistics. Another Tibetan 
variety spoken in Bhutan, Chochangacha, has received almost no study. The 
recent article of Tournadre and Rigzin (2015) distinguishes three verbal catego-
ries that express experiential evidentiality, personal evidentiality and possibility. 
Atypically, Chochangacha uses yöt for the experiential existential copula and 
yöt-pi for the personal (Tournadre and Rigzin 2015: 64). 
23 In the aorist and future tenses she calls this evidential setting ‘volitional’ rather than ‘perso-
nal experience’ (2005: 98 et passim). 
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1.3.3 Eastern varieties
It is convenient to discuss eastern varieties according to division in terms of 
Tibet’s traditional provinces of Amdo and Kham. 
The three phased description of the study of Lhasa evidentiality employed 
above serves equally well for describing the history of research on the evidential 
systems of Amdo dialects. In the first phase, George de Roerich (1958) describes 
the Reb-gong dialect of Amdo (specifically the speech of the famous intellectual 
Dge-ḥdun chos-ḥphel, 1902–1951, cf. Stoddard 1985) in terms of verb agreement. 
For example, he gives ṅa ǰ’o ɣ̮o̊-jol’ (ṅa ḥgro-gyin-yod) ‘je vais’ [I go], č‘’o ǰ’o ɣ̮o̊-dïɣ 
(khyod ḥgro-gyin-ḥdug) ‘tu vas’ [you go], etc. for le present simple (1958: 43) and ṅa 
joṅ-no̊--jin (ṅa yoṅ-ni-yin) ‘je suis venu’ [I came], č‘’o joṅ-no̊--rel’ (khyod yoṅ-ni-red) 
‘tu est venu’ [you came], etc. for one of three ways to conjugate le passé accompli 
(1958: 45). However, like the early researchers on Lhasa Tibetan, he makes clear 
that he is aware that what is at play here is not European style person agreement. 
For example, he notes that “[l]a conjugaison tibétaine – sauf quelques exceptions – 
ne connaît ni distinction de personne, ni distinction de nombre [Tibetan conju-
gation – with some exceptions – knows neither person distinctions nor number 
distinctions]” (1958: 43) and points out that “[e]xceptionnellement la forme jin 
s’étend aussi à la deuxième et troisième personne [exceptionally the jin form 
also extends to the second and third person]” giving the example č‘’o joṅ-no̊--jin 
(khyod yoṅ-ni-yin) ‘tu est venu’ [you came] (1958: 45). A particular weakness of de 
Roerich’s account of the Amdo verbal system is his failure to offer any semantic 
distinctions among the three ways of forming the passé accompli, which respec-
tively exhibit rel’, zïɣ, and t‘a as their exponents (1958: 45/46). Thus, Sun is justi-
fied in his criticism that in de Roerich’s work the “evidential morphology is buried 
unanalyzed in his section on ‘morphologie’” (Sun 1993: 948, Note 6). 
Despite his criticism of de Roerich, Sun does not himself shake off reference 
to person. He recognizes a distinction between ‘self person’ and ‘other person’, 
which he equates with ‘conjunct’/‘disjunct’ person marking.24 His use of this 
distinction is however inconsistent. At times he appears to use ‘self person’ as a 
name for a morphological category, for example writing that “the volitional self-
person forms (the default marking) represent direct knowledge of the volition” 
(1993: 961), but at other times ‘self person’ in his usage refers to a type of sen-
tence regardless of how it is marked morphologically, for example he writes that 
24 Despite this equation of ‘self person’ and ‘other person’ with ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ respec-
tively, Aikhenvald (2004: 45, 160, et passim), although she consulted Sun (1993), does not count 
Amdo Tibetan among those languages with conjunct-disjunct systems.
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“[s]elf-person sentences containing such verbs are usually marked with the direct 
evidential” (1993: 692). From Sun’s claim that “no particular evidential marking 
is employed for volitional self-person sentences” (1993: 958) one may surmise, 
along with Tribur (this volume), that the personal is zero-marked in Mdzo-dge 
Amdo.25 Adding the ‘personal’, which he avoids describing as evidential, and 
omitting the ‘quotative’, which he includes although it does not pattern with the 
other evidentials,26 the system he describes equates to three evidential settings in 
the past tense, ‘personal’ (unmarked), ‘direct’ (tʰæ), and ‘indirect’ (zəg), and two 
evidential settings in the present tense ‘personal’ (unmarked), and ‘immediate’ 
(ʰkə). This updated version of Sun’s description, with two evidential settings in 
the present and three in the past closely corresponds to Wang’s (1995) account. 
Taking the binary approach, Wang contrasts first person and third person 
forms in the future (respectively -rgyu-yin and rgyu-red) and present (respec-
tively -gi-yod and -ko-gi), but offers three options for the past, viz. a first person 
(-btaṅ-ṅa), third person (-btaṅ-gzig) and an additional third person form that 
is used if “the speaker has witnessed the action occurred” (1995: 61). As befits 
a pedagogical grammar Wang avoids the opaque terminology of ‘conjunct-dis-
junct’, but his ‘first person’ includes second person interrogatives (1995: 59/60 
et passim), so his description is in keeping with the conjunct-disjunct tradition. 
Sung and Rgyal describe the future and present contrast as ‘subjective’ (-a or 
-yin) versus ‘objective’ (-gi or -red) (2005: 168). The more complex options availa-
ble in the past they enumerate as ‘subjective’ (-a), ‘objective’ (-zig), ‘witnessed’ 
(-thal), and ‘focused’, with the fourth setting again offering ‘subjective’ (-ni-yin) 
and ‘objective’ (-ni-red) alternatives (2005: 205/206). Shao, in his description of 
the A-rig dialect, also takes a binary approach. He analyses the affixes into eight 
‘personal’ (自我中心) and 12 ‘non-personal’ (非自我中心) affixes (2014: 49/50). 
Among the ‘non-personal’ he further distinguishes some forms as ‘witnessed’ 
(亲见) and ‘assertive/factual’ (断言/事实) (2014: 49/50). 
25 Nonetheless, Sun’s comment that as “in other Tibetan dialects, the equative copulas jən [yin] 
and re [red]… carry inherent epistemological values: jən indicates that the reported situation is 
well-known to the speaker, otherwise re is used” (Sun 1993: 951, Note 10) suggests that personal 
evidentiality is sometimes explicitly morphologically indexed.
26 Although the “quotative morpheme se is, on both categorical and distributional counts, at 
variance with the other three evidential markers” (1993: 991), Sun lists it with the others because 
“it is quite common for evidentials not to constitute a unitary morphological category in a given 
language” (1993: 992). Such an analysis is unjustified, and his reliance upon the authority of 
others shows how one unjustified analysis may beget another. The cognates of se, decedents of 
Written Tibetan zer, are not normally considered evidential suffixes.
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Ebihara’s (2011) description is again similar, but she does not pursue 
person across all tenses but instead regards some tenses as encoding person 
and others as encoding evidentiality. She describes ten auxiliaries in Amdo, 
six of these forms she sets off in pairs of ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ forms across 
the three tenses ‘future’, ‘progressive’ and ‘explanation’ (2011: 58). Three of the 
four remaining suffixes she describes as evidential in value, two of which she 
identifies as ‘past’ (2011: 68). An odd facet of her analysis is that the evidential 
she describes as “used to express the event that the speaker performed, made 
somebody to perform, or is familiar with” (2011: 68) she does not identify with 
the ‘conjunct’. 
A step away from a binary account, Haller describes three distinct evidential 
categories across six tenses in the Themchen dialect (2004: 137). This description 
comes close to a structural account, but his terminological choices ‘volitional evi-
dentiell’, ‘nicht-volitional evidentiell’, and ‘nicht-evidentiell’ are still cast in terms 
of binary contrasts. Making use of original fieldwork on the Mgo-log dialect, Zoe 
Tribur (this volume), discusses in detail the previous research of Sun, Haller, and 
Ebihara. She emancipates herself from the specters of both person agreement 
and binary classificatory schemes, using the terminology ‘egophoric’, ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’. 
The similarity of the Amdo evidential system to Lhasa Tibetan is a point 
of controversy. Sun (1993) emphasizes the ways in which the Amdo evidential 
system differ from that of Lhasa, pointing out that the evidential exponents in the 
two languages are not cognate and suggesting that the Mdzo-dge system is less 
pragmatically flexible than the Lhasa system. The dissimilarity is however not as 
obvious as he presents it. The Mdzo-dge system corresponds very closely to the 
Themchen, but Haller (2004: 137/138) describes Themchen with the same labels 
he uses for the three categories of Shigatse cognate to the Lhasa personal, experi-
ential, and factual (vide supra). Likewise, Tribur judges that the Amdo evidential 
categories “appears to correspond closely to the Standard Tibetan system” (p. 416 
this volume).
The evidential systems of Kham dialects have so far received very little 
attention. In her description of the Nangchen dialect of Kham, Causemann 
(1989) does not clearly organize the verbal inflections into paradigms and 
does not describe the function of each affix individually. Nonetheless, for all 
tenses she distinguishes a witnessed (beobachtete) from a neutral form, and 
within the neutral forms distinguishing a typically first person from a typi-
cally third person form (1989: 104–108). The morphological material is often 
what one expects from Lhasa dialect (-yin, -yod, and -red as auxiliary verbs) 
and the system is also often parallel. The auxiliary verbs ^äin (yin) and re (red) 
are used in the formation of the future (in the suffixes džɨ-^äin and džɨ-re), 
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with the former associated with first person or third person if the speaker feels 
responsibility for the verbal action (1989: 88) and the latter used for second 
and third persons or impersonal verbs in the first person (1989: 88). The dura-
tive present distinguishes what could easily be called the personal -kɨ-^o’ (ki-
yod), factual -ki-re, and experiential ki-da and the past distinguishes personal 
-le-^äin, factual -le-re, and experiential -thi:. Causemann’s description leaves 
many questions open, e.g. the difference between the formation of the past 
with V-thi: and V-pa-thi: (1989: 108). Schwieger describes the verbal system of 
Brag-g.yab Tibetan without making explicit reference to evidentiality. He descri-
bes the present tense as marked with the three suffixes /jö:/, /jö: re:/, and /ṅgi/; 
the first is used “in Verbindung mit der ersten Person [in connection with the 
first person]”, the second “hat allgemeineren Charakter [has more general cha-
racter]” and the third expresses “die persönliche Wahrnehmung der Handlung 
[the personal perception of the action]” (1989: 34). Thus, the present tense of 
this variety exactly parallels Lhasa Tibetan. His presentation of the other tenses 
is less clear, perhaps in part because of the adverse circumstances under which 
his fieldwork was carried out (1989: 7/8). Suzuki (this volume) offers a prelimi-
nary treatment of the evidential system of Zhollam Tibetan. His discussion is 
based entirely on elicited data and does not organize the affixes into paradigms. 
The evidential systems of Nangchen, Brag-g.yab, Zhollam, and other Kham vari-
eties certainly merit further research.
The Baima language, which is not traditionally regarded as either an Amdo 
or Kham variety, serves as a fitting variety to conclude our discussion of research 
on Tibetan evidential systems aside from Lhasa. The evidential system of Baima, 
spoken at the border of Sichuan and Gansu, has received treatment in only one 
short article (Chirkova 2008). The author of that study, Katia Chirkova, returns in 
the current volume to the same topic, with much more detail provided by fresh 
fieldwork.
1.4  The historical development of Tibetan evidentials
According to many authorities the evidentials in Tibetan varieties arose inde-
pendently in the recent past. According to Beckwith “there is not the slightest 
evidence for the existence of personal deictic class in the Old Tibetan verbal 
system” (1992: 9). DeLancey concurs that Lhasa Tibetan evidential marking “is 
a recent innovation” (1992: 49). In Hongladarom’s words “there are no attested 
evidential contrasts [...] in the classical language” (1993: 52). Tournadre holds 
that “[l]’opposition égophorique/neutre n’existe pas dans la langue littéraire [the 
egophoric/neutral opposition does not exist in the literary language]” (1996: 220, 
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Note 9). These authors overlook Takeuchi’s observation that in Old Tibetan yin, 
an antecedent of the Lhasa Tibetan personal, is used to “話し手の判断，意志を
強調している [emphasize the speaker’s judgment and will]” (1990: 12); one may 
hope that the recent translation of Takeuchi's article into English will precipitate 
the careful examination of his evidence (2014: 410). Similarly, Denwood remarks 
that in Classical Tibetan ḥdug “usually has strongly the sense of discovery that it 
retains in Lhasa Tibetan” as a marker of the experiential (1999: 246). Hill confirms 
Denwood’s observation in texts from the 13th century onward (2013b). From an 
investigation of yod and ḥdug in the 14th century Rgyal-rabs gsal-baḥi me-loṅ. 
Hoshi concludes that in its basic components the Lhasa system was already in 
place at that time (2010). In the context of a detailed description of the verbal 
system of the 15th century Mi la ras paḥi rnam thar, among many other insights 
Oisel (2013: 81) identifies the contrast between the copula verbs yin (personal in 
Lhasa) and red (factual in Lhasa). His contribution to the current volume traces 
the development of this 15th century evidential system into Modern Literary 
Tibetan and Lhasa. The continued exploration of evidential values across the 
history of Tibetan literature will no doubt remain a fruitful domain of research. 
1.5 Notation and nomenclature
The authors who have contributed to this volume work in a diverse range of lan-
guages and approaches. We have exercised restraint in imposing an artificial 
univocality on the volume. In this section we discuss some of the notation and 
nomenclature that the reader will encounter. Although we have our own prefe-
rences, in general we have allowed the naturally arising heterogeneity to persist. 
In particular regard to evidentiality we have not constrained authors in terms 
of the names they give the evidential categories present in any language. As we 
mentioned in §1 the terminology in discussions of Tibetan evidentials has never 
been consistent, and authors from different research traditions have different 
preferences. Nonetheless, we have asked authors to avoid the term ‘egophoricity’ 
precisely to eschew the resulting confusion described in §2.2. 
For transcription each author employs his or her own phonemic orthogra-
phy for the specific variety in question. Transliteration of Written Tibetan follows 
Wylie, de Nebesky-Wojkowitz, or Library of Congress conventions. With regard to 
interlinear glossing, where conventions exist in the Leipzig Glossing Rules (LGR) 
(Comrie et al. 2008), authors attempt to conform to these standards. The conven-
tions of the LGR offer little guidance for glossing evidentiality. Authors in this 
volume have their own glossing conventions, depending on what terminology 
they use and categories they identify. 
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With regard to identifying the different Tibetan varieties as languages, dia-
lects or some other nomenclature, different terms relate to different perspec-
tives. In this chapter we have used the term ‘Lhasa Tibetan’; other researchers 
refer to Standard Tibetan. Although there are some differences between the 
two varieties (Róna-Tas 1985: 160/161), some researchers use these terms inter-
changeably. As mentioned earlier in this introduction, the title of this work 
and this introduction refer to the varieties of Tibetan spoken today as Tibetan 
languages. Other possible formulations include ‘Tibetan dialects’ and ‘Tibetic 
languages’. Tournadre (2014) argues for the term ‘Tibetic’ because the diversity 
of languages descending from Old Tibetan parallels the Germanic languages or 
Romance languages, i.e. Tibetic is a language family. Tournadre’s characteri-
zation of the diversity of this family is not in doubt, however, the term ‘dialect’ 
serves to designate the ‘Chinese dialects’ (also called Sinitic languages) and 
the ‘Arabic dialects’, which are also both language families of considerable 
age, size, and diversity. As the distinction between ‘dialect’ and ‘language’ 
is political rather than scientific, it is perhaps most legitimate to defer to the 
sense that Tibetans have of sharing a single language. It is for similar reasons 
of political solidarity that speakers of Arabic and speakers of Chinese respec-
tively regard themselves as speaking but one language. Some would want to 
draw the line between languages and dialects such that two mutually intelligi-
ble forms of speech are refereed to as ‘dialects’. Such an effort is not possible 
given the current state of knowledge on Tibetan varieties. Based as it is on 
the monolithic and sociolinguistically naïve notion of mutual intelligibility, 
such a division, even if possible, would still do violence to the full picture of 
Tibetan linguistic diversity. Even if one accepts the description of members 
of the family as ‘languages’ rather than as ‘dialects’, there is no a priori need 
for -ic rather than -an. It is true that many Indo-European subbranches end 
in -ic (Celtic, Germanic, Slavic, etc.) but others end in -an (Tokharian, Anato-
lian, Indo-Iranian). The difference between -ic and -an is of no significance 
in Europe and there is no need to make an issue of it in Asia. Thus, the choice 
among ‘Tibetan dialect’, ‘Tibetan language’ and ‘Tibetic language’ in this 
volume is left to the authors; the reader should merely note that these three 
designations refer to the same notion.
Abbreviations
1 first person, 2 second person, 3 third person, abl ablative, aux auxiliary, cop 
copula, dem demonstrative, dir direct, ego egophoric, erg ergative, exper 
experience, f female, fut future, gen genitive, hon honorific, ind indirect, 
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int intentional, inter interrogative, ipfv imperfective, loc locative, lq limiting 
quantifier, m male, nutral neutral, pe perceptual evidential, pfv perfective, 
prs present tense, prox proximal, pst past tense, rec receptive, sg singular, vis 
visible evidential, q question, qom quote marker.
References
Agha, Asif. 1993. Structural form and utterance context in Lhasa Tibetan: grammar and 
indexicality in a non-configurational language. New York: Peter Lang.
Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2004. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2012. The essence of mirativity. Linguistic Typology 16(3). 435–85.
Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2014. The grammar of knowledge: a cross-linguistic view of 
evidentials and the expression of information source. In Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald and R. 
M. W. Dixon (eds.), The Grammar of Knowledge: A Cross-Linguistic Typology, 1–50. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. 2015. Evidentials: Their links with other grammatical categories. 
Linguistic Typology 19(2). 239–277.
Bailey, T. Grahame. 1920. Linguistic Studies from the Himalayas. London: Royal Asiatic Society.
Bartee, Ellen. 1996. Deixis and spatiotemporal relations in Lhasa Tibetan. Arlington: The 
University of Texas MA thesis.
Bartee, Ellen. 2011. The role of animacy in the verbal morphology of Dongwang Tibetan. In 
Mark Turin and Bettina Zeisler (eds.), Himalayan Languages and Linguistics: Studies in 
Phonology, Semantics, Morphology and Syntax, 133–182. Leiden: Brill. 
Bashir, Elena. 2010. Traces of mirativity in Shina. Himalayan Linguistics 9(2). 1–55.
Beckwith, Christopher I. 1992. Deictic class marking in Tibetan and Burmese. In M. Ratliff  
and E. Schiller (eds.), Papers from the First Annual Meeting of the Southeast Asian 
Linguistics Society, 1–14. Tempe: Arizona State University, Program for Southeast  
Asian Studies.
Bell, Charles. 1905. Manual of Colloquial Tibetan. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press.
Bendix, Edward. 1974. Indo-Aryan and Tibeto-Burman contact as seen through Nepali and 
Newari verb tenses. International Journal of Dravidian Linguistics 3.1, 42–59.
Bhat, D. N. S. 1999. The Prominence of Tense, Aspect and Mood. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Bickel, Balthazar and Johanna Nichols. 2007. Inflectional morphology. In T. Shopen (ed.), 
Language typology and syntactic description, 169–240. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (Revised second edition).
Bielmeier, Roland. 1985. Das Märchen von Prinzen Čobzaṅ. Sankt Augustin: VGH Wissen-
schaftsverlag.
Bielmeier, Roland. 2000. Syntactic, semantic and pragmatic-epistemic functions of auxiliaries 
in Western Tibetan. Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area 23(2). 79–125.
Boas, Franz. 1911. Introduction. In F. Boas (ed.), Handbook of American Indian Languages, 
5–83. Part i. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution.
Byrne, St. Quentin. 1909. A Colloquial Grammar of the Bhutanese Language. Allahabad: 
Pioneer Press.
Caplow, Nancy. This volume. Inference and deferred evidence in Tibetan. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill 
(eds.) Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 225–257. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.
 1 The contribution of Tibetan languages to the study of evidentiality   33
Causemann, Margret (1989). Dialekt und Erzählungen der Nangchenpas. Bonn: VGH  
Wissenschaftsverlag.
Chang, Kun & Betty Shefts. 1964. A Manual of Spoken Tibetan (Lhasa Dialect). Seattle: 
University of Washington Press.
Chang, Kun & Betty Chang. 1984. The certainty hierarchy among Spoken Tibetan verbs of 
being. Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica 55. 603–635. 
Chirkova, Katia 2008. 白马语示证范畴及其与藏语方言的比较 baimayu shizheng fanchou ji qi 
yu Zangyu fangyan de bijiao [Evidentials in Baima and Tibetan dialects compared] 民族语
文 Minzu yuwen 3. 36–43.
Chirkova, Katia. This volume. Evidentials in Pingwu Baima. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill (eds.), 
Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 445–459. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.
Chonjore, Tsetan. 2003. Colloquial Tibetan: a textbook of the Lhasa dialect with reference 
grammar and exercises. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.
Comrie, Bernard, Haspelmath, Martin, & Bickel, Balthasar. 2008. Leipzig glossing rules.  
http: //www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/resources/glossing-rules.php Retrieved 2015-06-07
Curnow, Timothy Jowan. 2002a. Conjunct/disjunct marking in Awa Pit. Linguistics 40(3). 
611–627.
Curnow, Timothy Jowan. 2002b. Conjunct/disjunct systems in Barbacoan languages. In Jeanie 
Castillo (ed.), Proceedings from the fourth Workshop on American Indigenous Languages, 
3–12. (Santa Barbara Papers in Linguistics 11). Santa Barbara: UCSB Department of 
Linguistics.
Dahl, Östen. 2000. Egophoricity in discourse and syntax. Functions of Language 7(1). 37–77. 
Daudey, Henriëtte. 2014a. A grammar of Wadu Pumi. Melbourne: La Trobe University 
dissertation.
Daudey, Henriëtte. 2014b. Volition and control in Wǎdū Pǔmǐ. Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman 
Area 37(1). 75–103.
DeLancey, Scott. 1985. Lhasa Tibetan evidentials and the semantics of causation. Proceedings 
of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. 65–72.
DeLancey, Scott. 1986. Evidentiality and volitionality in Tibetan. In Wallace L. Chafe and 
Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: the linguistic coding of epistemology, 203–213. 
Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Pub. Corp.
DeLancey, Scott. 1990. Ergativity and the cognitive model of event structure in Lhasa Tibetan. 
Cognitive Linguistics 1(3). 289–321.
DeLancey, Scott. 1992. The historical origin of the conjunct-disjunct pattern in Tibeto-Burman. 
Acta Linguistica Hafniensia 25. 289–321. 
DeLancey, Scott 1997. Mirativity: The grammatical marking of unexpected information. 
Linguistic Typology 1. 33–52. 
DeLancey, Scott. 2001. The mirative and evidentiality. Journal of Pragmatics 33. 369–382. 
DeLancey, Scott. 2003. Lhasa Tibetan. In Graham Thurgood and Randy J. LaPolla (eds.), The 
Sino-Tibetan languages, 255–269. London: Routledge.
Delancey, Scott. 2012. Still mirative after all these years. Linguistic Typology 16 (3). 529–564.
DeLancey, Scott. 2015. The Historical Dynamics of Morphological Complexity in Trans-
Himalayan. Linguistic Discovery 13(2), 60–79.
Denwood, Philip. 1999. Tibetan. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Desjarlais, Robert R. 1992. Body and emotion: the aesthetics of illness and healing in the Nepal 
Himalayas. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Dickinson, Connie. 2000. Mirativity in Tsafiki. Studies in Language 24(2). 379–421.
34   Nathan W. Hill and Lauren Gawne
van Driem, George. 1998. Dzongkha. Leiden: Research CNWS, School of Asian, African, and 
Amerindian Studies.
van Driem, George. 2015. Synoptic grammar of the Bumthang language: A language of the 
central Bhutan highlands. Himalayan Linguistics Archive 6. 1–77.
Ebihara Shiho. 2011. Amdo Tibetan. In Yasuhiro Yamakoshi (ed.), Grammatical Sketches from 
the Field, 41–78. Tokyo: Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa 
(ILCAA), Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.
Ebihara, Shiho. This volume. Evidentiality of the Tibetan Verb snang. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill (eds.),  
Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 41–59. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.
Francke, August Hermann. 1901. A Sketch of Ladakhi Grammar. Journal of the Royal Asiatic 
Society of Bengal (Part 1-History, Literature, etc.) 70(1), extra No. 2. 1–63.
Garrett, Edward John. 2001. Evidentiality and Assertion in Tibetan. Los Angeles: University of 
California dissertation. 
Gawne, Lauren. 2014. Evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo. Journal of the South East Asian 
Linguistics Society 7. 76–96. 
Gawne, Lauren. This volume. Egophoric evidentiality in Bodish languages. In L. Gawne &  
N.W. Hill (eds.), Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 61–94. Berlin; Boston: Mouton 
de Gruyter.
Goldstein, Melvyn C. and Nawang Nornang. 1970. Modern spoken Tibetan: Lhasa dialect. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Hagège, Claude. 1982. La structure des langues, Que sais-je? Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France.
Hale, Austin. 1971. Person markers: conjunct and disjunct forms. Topics in Newari Grammar l. 
1–12. SIL.
Hale, Austin. 1980. Person markers: Finite conjunct and disjunct verb forms in Newari. In R. 
L. Trail (ed.), Papers in South-East Asian linguistics, Vol. 7, 95–106. Canberra: Australian 
National University.
Hale, Austin & Kedār P. Shrestha. 2006. Newār (Nepāl Bhāsā). Munich: Lincom Europa.
Haller, Felix (2000). Dialekt und Erzählungen von Shigatse. Bonn: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag.
Haller, Felix (2004). Dialekt und Erzählungen von Themchen: sprachwissenschaftliche 
Beschreibung eines Nomadendialektes aus Nord-Amdo. Bonn: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag.
Hargreaves, David. 2003. Kathmandu Newar (Nepal Bhāśā). In Graham Thurgood and Randy J. 
LaPolla (eds.), The Sino-Tibetan Languages, 371–384. London: Routledge.
Hargreaves, David. 2005. Agency and intentional action in Kathmandu Newar. Himalayan 
Linguistics 5. 1–48. 
Hari, Anna Maria. 2010. Yohlmo Sketch Grammar. Kathmandu: Ekta books.
Henderson, Vincent C. 1903. Tibetan manual. Calcutta: Inspector General of Chinese imperial 
maritime customs.
Hermann, Silke. 1989. Erzählungen und Dialekt von Diṅri. Bonn: VGH wissenschaftsverlag.
Hill, Nathan W. 2012. ‘Mirativity’ does not exist: ḥdug in ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan and other suspects. 
Linguistic Typology 16(3). 389–433. 
Hill, Nathan W. 2013a. Contextual semantics of ‘Lhasa’ Tibetan evidentials. SKASE Journal of 
Theoretical Linguistics 10(3). 47–54.
Hill, Nathan W. 2013b. ḥdug as a testimonial marker in Classical and Old Tibetan. Himalayan 
Linguistics 12(1). 1–16. 
Hill, Nathan W. This volume. Testimonial perfect constructions: the inferential semantics of 
direct evidence. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill (eds.), Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 
131–159. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.
 1 The contribution of Tibetan languages to the study of evidentiality   35
Hock, Hans Henrich. 2012. Sanskrit and Pāṇini–Core and Periphery. Saṃskṛtavimarśaḥ  
6: 85–102.
Hongladarom, Krisadawan. 1992. Semantic peculiarities of Tibetan verbs of being. In S. 
Luksaneeyanawin (ed.), Pan-Asiatic Linguistics, Proceedings of the Third International 
Symposium on Language and Linguistics, Vol. III. 1151–1162.
Hongladarom, Krisadawan. 1993. Evidentials in Tibetan: A dialogic study of the interplay 
between form and meaning. Bloomington: Indiana University dissertation.
Hoshi Izumi (星泉). 2010. 14 世紀チベット語文献『王統明示鏡』における存在動詞. 14 
Seiki Chibetto-go bunken “ōtō meiji-kyō” ni okeru sonzaidōshi. [Existential verbs in the 
Rgyal rabs gsal ba’i me long, a 14th century Tibetan narrative]. 東京大学言語学論集
Tōkyōdaigaku gengo-gaku ronshū / Tokyo University Linguistic Papers 29(3). 29–68.
Hoshi Michiyo (星 実千代). 1988. 現代チベット語文法（ラサ方言）. Gendai Chibetto-go 
bunpō (Rasahōgen). [Modern Tibetan grammar (Lhasa Dialect)]. Tokyo: ユネスコ東アジア
文化研究センター Yunesuko Higashi Ajia Bunka Kenkyū Sentā.
Huber, Brigitte. 2005. The Tibetan dialect of Lende (Kyirong). Bonn: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag.
Hyslop, Gwendolyn & Karma Tshering. This volume. An overview of some epistemic categories 
in Dzongkha. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill (eds.), Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 
351–365. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.
Jones, Eunice. 2009. Evidentiality and Mirativity in Balti. London: SOAS, University of London 
MA thesis. 
Kelly, Barbara F. 2004. A grammar of Sherpa. In C. Genetti (ed.), Tibeto-Burman languages of 
Nepal: Manange and Sherpa, 232–440. Canberra: Pacific Linguistics.
Kitamura Hajime. 1977. Tibetan (Lhasa dialect). Tokyo: Ajia Afurika gengo bunka kenkyūjo.
Koshal, Sanyukta. 1979. Ladakhi Grammar. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Knuchel, Dominique. 2015. A comparative study of egophoric marking: Investigating its relation 
to person and epistemic marking in three language families. Stockholm: Stockholms 
universitet MA thesis.
Kretschmar, Monika. 1986. Erzählungen und Dialekt der Drokpas aus Südwest-Tibet. Sankt 
Augustin: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag.
Kretschmar, Monika. 1995. Erzählungen und Dialekt aus Südmustang. Bonn: VGH Wissen-
schaftsverlag.
Lidz, Liberty A. 2010. A Descriptive Grammar of Yongning Na (Mosuo). Austin: University of 
Texas dissertation.
Loughnane, Robyn. 2009. A Grammar of Oksapmin. Melbourne: University of Melbourne 
dissertation.
Norman, Rebecca. 2001. Getting Started in Ladakhi. (2nd edition). Leh: Melong Publications.
Oisel, Guillaume. 2013. Morphosyntaxe et sémantique des auxiliaires et des connecteurs du 
Tibétain Littéraire. Paris: Université Sorbonne Nouvelle - Paris 3 dissertation.
Oisel, Guillaume. This volume. On the origin of the Lhasa Tibetan evidentials song and byung. 
In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill (eds.), Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 161–183. Berlin; 
Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.
Oswalt, Robert L. 1986. The evidential system of Kashaya. In Wallace L. Chafe & Johanna 
Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: the linguistic coding of epistemology, 29–45. Norwood, N.J.: 
Ablex Pub. Corp.
Post, Mark W. 2007. A Grammar of Galo. Melbourne: La Trobe University dissertation.
Post, Mark W. 2013. Person-sensitive TAME marking in Galo: Historical origins and functional 
motivation. In T. Thornes, E. Andvik, G. Hyslop & J. Jansen (eds.), Functional-Historical 
Approaches to Explanation, 107–130. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
36   Nathan W. Hill and Lauren Gawne
Rangan, K. 1979. Purik Grammar. Mysore: Central Institute of Indian Languages. 
Read, Alfred F. C. 1934. Balti Grammar. London: Royal Asiatic Society.
de Roerich, George. 1958. Le parler de l’Amdo: étude d’un dialecte archaïque du Tibet. Rome: 
Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
Roerich, George & Lopsang Phuntshok. 1957. Textbook of colloquial Tibetan: dialect of central 
Tibet. Calcutta: Govt. of West Bengal, Education Dept., Education Bureau.
Róna-Tas, András. 1985. Wiener Vorlesungen zur Sprach- und Kulturgeschichte Tibets. Wien: 
Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien.
Rule, W. M. 1977. A comparative study of the Foe, Huli and Pole languages of Papua New 
Guinea. Sydney: University of Sydney.
San Roque, Lila. 2008. An introduction to Duna grammar. Canberre: The Australian National 
University dissertation. 
San Roque, Lila, Floyd, Simeon, & Norcliffe, Elisabeth. 2017. Evidentiality and  
interrogativity. Lingua. 120–143. 
San Roque, Lila & Robin Loughnane. 2012. The New Guinea Highlands evidentiality area. 
Linguistic Typology 16(1). 111–167.
Sandberg, Graham. 1894. Hand-book of colloquial Tibetan. A practical guide to the language of 
Central Tibet. Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and co.
Sandberg, Graham. 1888. Manual of the Sikkim Bhutia Language or Dénjong Ké. Calcutta: 
Oxford Mission Press. 
Sandberg, Graham. 1895. Manual of the Sikkim Bhutia Language or Dénjong Ké (second and 
enlarged edition). London: Archibald Constable & Co.
Schwieger, Peter. 1989. Tibetisches Erzählgut aus Brag-g.yab: Texte mit Übersetzungen, 
grammatischem Abriss und Glossar. Bonn: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag.
Schwieger, Peter. 2002. Zur Funktion der verbalen Kongruenz im Lhasa-Tibetischen. In D. 
Dimitrov, U. Roesler, and R. Steiner (eds.), 175–184. Sikhisamuccayah: Indian and Tibetan 
Studies. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien.
Schöttelndreyer, Burkhard. 1980. Person Markers in Sherpa. In S. A. Wurm (ed.), Papers in 
Southeast Asian Linguistics No.7, 125–130. Canberra: The Australian National University.
Shao, Mingyuan (邵明園). 2014. 安多藏语阿柔话的示证范畴 Anduo zangyu arou hua de 
shizheng fanchou [Evidentiality in A-rig Dialect of Amdo Tibetan]. Nankai: Nankai 
University dissertation.
Sharma, D. D. 2004. Tribal Languages of Ladakh. Part III. A Descriptive Grammar of Purki and 
Balti. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. 
Sresthacharya, Iswaranand, Jagan Nath Maskey & Austin Hale. 1971. Conversational Newari. 
Kathmandu: Summer Institute of Linguistics, Institute for Nepal Studies, Tribhuvan 
University. 
Sresthacarya, Iswaranda. 1976. Some types of reduplication in the Newari verb phrase.  
Contributions to Nepalese Studies 3(1). 117–127. 
Stoddard, Heather. 1985. Le mendiant de l’Amdo. Paris: Société d’ethnographie.
Strahm, Esther. 1975. Clause Patterns in Jirel. In Austin Hale (ed.), Collected Papers on Sherpa, 
Jirel, 73–146. Kirtipur: Summer Institute of Linguistics.
Sun, Jackson T.-S. 1993. Evidentials in Amdo Tibetan. Bulletin of the Institute of History and 
Philology, Academia Sinica 63(4). 143–188.
Suzuki, Hiroyuki. This volume. The evidential system of Zhollam Tibetan. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill 
(eds.), Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 423–444. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
 1 The contribution of Tibetan languages to the study of evidentiality   37
Sung, Kuo-ming & Lha Byams Rgyal. 2005. Colloquial Amdo Tibetan: A Complete Course for 
Adult English Speakers. Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House. 
Takeuchi, Tsuguhito (武内紹人). 1978. 現代チベット語における文の構造. Gendai Chibetto-go 
ni okeru bun no kōzō [The structure of the sentence in modern Tibetan]. Kyoto: Kyoto 
University MA thesis.
Takeuchi, Tsuguhito (武内紹人). 1990. チベット語の述部における助動詞の機能とその発
達過程 Chibetto-go no jutsubu ni okeru jodōshi no kinō to sono hattatsu katei / The 
semantic Function of Auxiliary verbs in Tibetan and their historical development. In Osamu 
Sakiyama and Akihiro Sato (eds.), Asian Languages and General Linguistics, 6–16. Tokyo: 
Sanseido.
Takeuchi, Tsuguhito (武内紹人). 2014. The function of auxiliary verbs in Tibetan predicates 
and their historical development. Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 31. 401–415. (Translation of 
Takeuchi 1990). 
Tournadre, Nicolas. 1992. La déixis en tibétain: quelques faits remarquables. In Morel M.-A.  
et Danon-Boileau L. (ed.), La Deixis, 197–208. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Tournadre, Nicolas. 1994. Personne et médiatifs en tibétain. Faits de langues 3. 149–158.
Tournadre, Nicolas. 1996. L’ergativité en tibétain: approche morphosyntaxique de la langue 
parlée. Louvain: Peeters.
Tournadre, Nicolas. 2008. Arguments against the concept of ‘conjunct’/‘disjunct’ in Tibetan. 
In B. Huber, M. Volkart & P. Widmer (eds.), Chomolangma, Demawend und Kasbek, 
Festschrift für Roland Bielmeier, 281–308. Saale: International Institute for Tibetan and 
Buddhist Studies.
Tournadre Nicolas. 2014. The Tibetic languages and their classification. In Nathan W. Hill 
and Thomas Owen-Smith (eds.), Trans-Himalayan linguistics, historical and descriptive 
linguistics of the Himalayan area, 105–130. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Tournadre, Nicolas. This volume. A typological sketch of evidential/epistemic categories in the 
Tibetic language. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill (eds.), Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 
95–129. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.
Tournadre, Nicolas & Sangda Dorje. 2003. Manual of standard Tibetan: Language and 
civilisation. Ithaca: Snowlion Publications.
Tournadre, Nicolas & Sangda Dorje. 2009. Manuel de tibétain standard: langue et civilisation. 
Paris: Langues & mondes, L’Asiathèque.
Tournadre, Nicolas & Konchok Jiatso. 2001. Final auxiliary verbs in literary Tibetan and in the 
dialects. Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area 23(3). 49–111. 
Tournadre, Nicolas & Randy J. LaPolla. 2014. Towards a new approach to evidentiality: Issues 
and directions for research. Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area 37(2). 240–263.
Tournadre, Nicolas & Karma Rigzin. 2015. Outline of Chocha-Ngacha. Himalayan Linguistics 
14(2). 49–87.
Tournadre, Nicolas, Lhakpa Norbu Sherpa, Gyurme Chodrak & Guillaume Oisel. 2009. Sherpa-
English and English-Sherpa dictionary. Kathmandu: Vajra Publication.
Tribur, Zoe. This volume. Observations on factors affecting the distributional properties of 
evidential markers in Amdo Tibetan. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill (eds.), Evidential systems of 
Tibetan languages, 367–421. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.
Vesalainen, Olavi & Marja Vesalainen. 1980. Clause Patterns in Lhomi. Canberra: Pacific 
Linguistics, Australian National University.
Wang, Qingshan (王青山). 1995. A Grammar of Spoken Amdo Tibetan. Chengdu: Sichuan 
Nationality Publishing House.
38   Nathan W. Hill and Lauren Gawne
Watters, David E. 2006. The conjunct-disjunct distinction in Kaike. Nepalese Linguistics 22. 
300–319.
Woodbury, Anthony C. 1986. Interactions of tense and evidentiality: a study of Sherpa and 
English. In Wallace L. Chafe and Johanna Nichols (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic 
Coding of Epistemology, 188–202. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Yliniemi, Juha. This volume. Copulas in Denjongke or Sikkimese Bhutia. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill  
(eds.), Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 297–349. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de 
Gruyter.
Yukawa Yasutoshi (湯川恭敏). 1966. チベット語のduuの意味 Chibettogo no duu no imi [The 
meaning of Tibetan duu]. 言語研究 Gengo Kenkyū 49. 77–84.
Yukawa Yasutoshi (湯川恭敏). 1971. チベット語の述部の輪郭 Chibettogo no jutsubu no rinkaku 
[Outline of Tibetan Predicates]. 言語学の基本問題 Gengogaku no kihon mondai / Basic 
problems in linguistics. Tokyo: 大修館書店 Taishūkan Shoten. 178–204.
Yukawa Yasutoshi (湯川恭敏). 1975. チベット語の述語 Chibettogo no jutsugo [The Predicates 
of Tibetan] アジア·アフリカ文法硏究 Ajia Afurika bunpō kenkyū / Asian & African 
Linguistics 4. 1–14. Tokyo: ILCAA.
Yukawa Yasutoshi (湯川恭敏). This volume. Lhasa Tibetan Predicates. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill 
(eds.), Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 187–224. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de 
Gruyter. (Translation of Yukawa 1975).
Zeisler, Bettina. 2004. Relative tense and aspectual values in Tibetan languages: A comparative 
study. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Zemp, Marius. This volume. Evidentiality in Purik Tibetan. In L. Gawne & N.W. Hill (eds.), 
Evidential systems of Tibetan languages, 261–296. Berlin; Boston: Mouton de Gruyter.
